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GO WORLD

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1979 NO.15



THE ISHI PRESS



Otake makes a good start in the 4th Meijin title match.

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Front cover: A painting, probably Chinese, from the Narita Collection depicting a favourite go theme. A woodcutter in ancient China comes upon two immortals playing go in the mountains. He becomes so absorbed in watching the game that he is oblivious to the passage of time. When he comes to his senses, he finds that decades have passed and that the handle of his axe has rotted. This legend is the source of a traditional name for go, 'ranka' or 'the rotted handle'.

Back cover: Two twentieth century works from the Narita collection. The hanging scroll is by the Tsugaru painter Nozawa Joyo. The calligraphic scroll is by the Hirosaki calligrapher Takayama Shodo and it features a quotation from an unknown source which translates as, 'in a game of go can be discerned the principles of this transitory life'.

Go World is published by The Ishi Press.
Address subscriptions to The Ishi Press,
Inc., CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan
Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (6 issues by seamail)
Price per single issue: ¥835
Airmail rate: ¥6,900 per year; ¥1,150 per single issue
(Discounts are available for bulk orders by seamail)

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first.

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The challenger, nicknamed 'razor-sharp Sakata', noted for his brilliance and inventiveness in the infighting, winner of sixty titles.

Sakata Wins Meijin League Otake Takes Early Lead

When the final round of the 4th Meijin league was played on the 16th August, five players — Sakata, Takemiya, Kato, Rin and Hashimoto — were still in the running for at least a tie for first place, but when the dust settled, the veteran Sakata Eio 9-dan had pulled one point clear of the pack, thus becoming the Meijin challenger. The results in the 8th round were as follows:

Sakata beat Hashimoto by 4½ points

Cho beat Takemiya by 4½ points



Otake Meijin — lost the Gosei title to Cho, but his prospects for remaining Meijin look good.

Kato beat Yamashiro by resignation

Ishida beat Rin by 2½ points

Takemiya's loss to Cho meant that the complications of a tie were avoided. Takemiya must have been unhappy, after leading all the way in the league, but this was a magnificent recovery by Sakata. Early on he had suffered surprise losses to two newcomers to the league, Ushinohama and Yamashiro, and this had seemed to put him out of the running, but thereafter he defeated all the big guns of the league.

Sakata is the greatest title-winner of go history, the sixty titles to his credit being three times

4th Meijin League (as of 10th August)

Rank	Name	R	K	S	C	H	I	U	T	Y	Score	Place
1	Rin	—	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	4-4	4
2	Kato	0	—	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5-3	2
3	Sakata	1	1	—	1	1	1	0	1	0	6-2	1
4	Cho	0	1	0	—	0	1	0	1	1	4-4	5
5	Hashimoto	0	0	0	1	—	1	1	0	1	4-4	6
6	Ishida	1	0	0	0	0	—	1	0	1	3-5	—
7	Ushinohama	0	0	1	1	0	0	—	0	0	2-6	—
7	Takemiya	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	—	1	5-3	3
7	Yamashiro	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	—	3-5	—

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

the total of his nearest rivals (Rin and Otake, with twenty each), and he virtually dominated Japanese go in the 1960's. Although it is four years since he last played in a title series (the 30th Honinbo title, which he lost to Ishida), he has been enjoying excellent form this year and will be determined to make the most of this opportunity to crown his career with another major title.

The defending champion, Otake, has been in indifferent form this year, so Sakata was considered by many to be the favourite. Once the series began, however, it proved to be a different story. Perhaps the pressure of two-day games brings out the best in Otake, for he has already secured a dangerous-looking lead over the challenger. The results:

Game 1 (Sept. 12, 13). Otake won by $6\frac{1}{2}$ points.
Game 2 (Sept. 26, 27). Otake won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Late news. The third game, played on the 3rd and 4th October, was won by Sakata by resignation.

Correction. A win by Cho against Kato was omitted from the Meijin league chart in GW14.

Hashimoto Shoji Wins Kisei 2nd Stage

The 2nd stage of the 4th Kisei title has now been completed and the winner is Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, who beat Rin Kaiho in the final played on the 13th September. The third stage will begin in October and this year there are eight participants.

Seeded title-holders: Otake Meijin, Kato Honinbo, Ishida Oza

2nd stage winner: Hashimoto Shoji

Recommended players: Rin Kaiho (2nd in 2nd stage)

Ishii Kunio 9-dan and Sato Masaharu 7-dan (equal third in 2nd stage)

Sakata Eio (Meijin challenger)

Ishida Akira Wins Shinjin-O Title

Ishida Akira, then 7-dan, won the 4th Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title by defeating Yamashiro Hiroshi 6-dan by 2-1 in the final. This title is open to players up to 7-dan and 35 years in age.

Haruyama Wins P.M.'s Cup

Haruyama Isamu 7-dan, well-known to western players for his English go books and his frequent instruction tours, has won his first title, the 23rd Prime Minister's Cup. This title is open to



Hashimoto Shoji – winning the Kisei 2nd Stage must make up a little for losing the Judan match.


5- to 7-dan professionals at the Tokyo branch of the Nihon Ki-in. In the final Haruyama defeated Umeki Suguru 5-dan with two straight wins.

Kato to Challenge Ishida Oza

Not content with the Honinbo, Judan and Tengen titles, Kato Masao is having a crack at the Oza title. Kato defeated Kobayashi Koichi 8-dan in the final round of the tournament, held on 4th October, thus earning the right to challenge his fellow Kitani disciple, Ishida Yoshio, for the title.

Autumn Promotions

The following players have earned promotions in the autumn session of the oteai (rating tour-



Haruyama 7-dan wins his first title.



The newest 9-dan – Sanno Hirotaka

nament):

To 9-dan: Sanno Hirotaka

To 8-dan: Kaji Kazutame, Ishida Akira

To 6-dan: Kobayashi Satoru

To 4-dan: Kanda Ei, Kondo Sachiko

Two promotions of interest from the final rounds of the spring tournament which we neglected to record were those of Kobayashi Kenji, the middle Kobayashi brother, to 4-dan and Tsuchida Masamitsu to 9-dan. Tsuchida is the third 9-dan produced by the Nagoya (Central Japan) branch of the Nihon Ki-in.

Quebec Open Go Championship

The First Open Go Championship of the Province of Quebec, organized by the Quebec Go Association, was held in Montreal on the 8th and 9th September, and was a great success, with a total of forty-three participants. The six round Swiss McMahon event was run by Denis Labelle.

Results:

1st: Bruce Amos 5-dan (Toronto)

2nd: Yasuo Nankawa 2-dan (New York)

3rd: Louis Leroux 4-dan (Montreal)

4th: Andre Labelle 2-dan, Yuzo Ota 2-dan (both of Montreal)

top kyu: Jean Paul Ouellet (Montreal), with a formidable five wins, including three against dan players; he was promptly promoted to 1-dan

6–10 kyu prize: Rene Donais 6-kyu (Montreal)

10–15 kyu prize: Francois Hammono 10-kyu (Montreal)

beginners prize: Robert Bonsant 15-kyu (Montreal)

special prize for the biggest upset win: Yasuro

Nakajima 1-dan (Toronto) for defeating Bruce Amos

The tournament was honoured by the presence of Miss Chizu Kobayashi, professional 5-dan, whose wit, charm, and grace made a lasting impression on all. She played simultaneous games (winning most of them) and conducted very lucid and inspiring commentaries.

The success of the tournament greatly encouraged the Quebec Go Association to host the 1980 Canadian Championships in Montreal.

(Report from Tibor Bogнар)

2nd World Amateur Go Championship

To date the following national representatives have been decided for the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship, to be held at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo from the 25th to the 29th March, 1980.

Japan: Tsutsumi Kayoko, 1979 Women's Champion

Europe: Jurgen Mattern, 1979 European Champion

Austria: Helmut Hasibeder

Czechoslovakia: Vladimir Lassak

F. R. Germany: Bernd Wolter

Holland: Ronald Schlemper

Yugoslavia: Zoran Mutabzija

U.S.A.: Takao Matsuda, Ned Phipps (one place still to be decided)

Australia: John Power

1979 U. S. Championships

The 1979 American Go Association Championships were held simultaneously at Berkeley and New York on Labor Day weekend, the 1st to the 3rd September. The Eastern Championship was won by Shin Kang 6-dan, the 1978 U.S. champion, and the Western by Kyung Kim 7-dan of San Francisco, both of whom were members of the U.S. team in the 1st World Amateur Go Championship. Since there is a restriction that any member of the 1979 team must win the championship in order to get a place on the 1980 team, Kang and Kim will meet in a 3-game playoff to decide both the U.S. championship and the place on the team.

The above restriction is designed to ensure that there are at least two new faces on the team each year. In 1980 these 'new faces' will be the second place-getters in the above tournaments, who are Ned Phipps 5-dan of San Francisco, a past president of the Berkeley Go club, and Takao Matsuda 6-dan of New York, who actually has won the U.S. championship more than anyone else.

Australian Go Championship

The 1979 Australian Go Championship was held in Canberra on the 1st and 2nd September. The top tournament, the Australian Open Championship, was won by I. Hou of Sydney with six straight wins, while last year's champion, H. Masuda of Sydney, came second with five wins and one loss. Third was Sang Dae Hahn of Melbourne with 4-2 and Alastair Brodie of Sydney was fourth with 3-3.

A second tournament, open to players eligible to represent Australia in the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship (players cannot make the trip more than once every three years) was won by John Power 3-dan with six straight wins. Second was John Chen 1-dan of Canberra with 5-1.

Michael Redmond's Progress

Michael Redmond of Santa Barbara is making solid progress after two years' experience playing in the insei league at the Nihon Ki-in. Michael is now ranked number ten out of the fifty-eight insei or professional disciples at the Nihon Ki-in. This puts him within shooting range of professional shodan, as the top ten insei form a special group which plays more seriously (only three games a week in contrast to the four or more of the other insei). More importantly, this group is automatically entitled to participate in the twice-annual tournaments to qualify as professional shodan. Although Michael made a late start at go by Japanese standards, he is, at sixteen years of age, the fourth youngest of the top ten insei.

Hosai Wins Place in Honinbo League

The first of the four vacant seats in the 35th Honinbo league was decided in a playoff held on the 4th October. The veteran player Fujisawa Hosai (born 1919), who was the first 9-dan produced by the modern rating system, defeated Sugiuchi Masao 9-dan with the aid of his favourite mane-go (imitation go) strategy. Hosai was the Honinbo challenger in 1957, but has been in a bit of decline since dropping out of the Honinbo league in 1973 and the Meijin league in 1975. He is an aggressive fighting player who should liven up the league considerably.

5th Tengen Tournament

Three of the semifinal places in the 5th Tengen tournament have been decided. One semifinal will be fought between Ohira 9-dan, who defeated his old rival from the 1st Tengen title match,



After biding his time for the past few years, Fujisawa Hosai makes a welcome comeback to the Honinbo league.

Fujisawa Shuko, in the quarter-final, and the rising young star Kataoka Satoshi 5-dan. The other semifinal features the ubiquitous Kato, but his opponent is yet to be decided.

1979 European Championship: Full Placings

The biggest field for many years entered this year's European championship, including seven players from Holland, the country which is rapidly becoming the powerhouse of European go. With such a strong field no one managed to come through unscathed and so three players tied for first place: Jurgen Mattern 6-dan of West Germany, who had already won this tournament seven times in the past, and two Dutch players, Ronald Schlemper 5-dan and Robert Rehm 4-dan, all with 7-2 scores. Readers may recall that Rehm won the 1979 Hamburg Affensprung tournament — he must be the strongest 4-dan in Europe.

Jurgen Mattern won both his games to clinch the playoff, though he was not without his share of luck in the game against Schlemper. The latter defeated his fellow countryman to take second place, so Rehm had to be content with third.

Final scores in the tournament were:

- 1st) J. Mattern (W. Ger.): 7-2
- R. Schlemper (Holl.): 7-2
- R. Rehm (Holl.): 7-2
- 4th) M. Rebattu (Holl.): 6-3
- M. Macfadyen (G. Brit.): 6-3
- R. van Zeijst (Holl.): 6-3

Continued on page 15

17th Judan Title

Game Two

The second game of the Judan title match was played in Osaka, the home ground of the Kansai Ki-in. This probably put all the more pressure on Hashimoto to take revenge for his defeat in the opening game. In a best-of-five series the second game is crucial.

White: Kato Masao, Honinbo, Judan & Tengen

Black: Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 23rd March, 1979





Figure 1 (1 - 28)

Figure 1 (1 - 28)


White 18 is territory-oriented. Defending at 'a' is more solid.

Black 19. This move is played to set up a ladder. When White extends down at 18, Black can cut at 1 in Dia. 1. The sequence to 14 follows, whereupon the question of the ladder with 15 is crucial.

White 20. A makeshift to forestall the ladder. The exchange for 21 is bad for White, but the ex-



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

change from 19 to 28 is much worse for Black. Note that if White plays 26 at 28, Black will get good, solid shape by playing at 26 himself.




Figure 2 (29 - 64)


Figure 2 (29 - 64)

White 38. According to Kato, White 'a' is more important. Black takes an important strategic point with 39. Kajiwara felt that White should have played 38 at 39.


White 40 is correct style. White 1 in Dia. 2 is bad as Black can aim at cutting at 'a' and attaching at 'b'.

White 42 is the central point for influence. If White plays at 'b', Black will welcome the chance to play at 42 himself.

Black 43, 45. Trying to live on the side, without running out towards the centre, is the correct approach. If White gets the chance to chase Black out into the centre, he will be able to erase



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Black's moyo at the bottom. However, Black should have peeped at 63 before playing 43. At this stage White would have no choice but to connect, so settling his group would have been easier for Black.


White 56 is the severest move. If White hanes at 1 in Dia. 3, he has to defend at 5 to prevent Black from living with Black 5, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Dia. 4 shows that Black cannot get two eyes here after 56 and 58.

White 60 is a very severe move. If Black replies at the top, at 1 in Dia. 5, for example, White will attack with 2. Black cannot get a second eye with 3 to 7, so his group is in considerable danger.


Black 63 is an overplay, as White can counter-attack with 64 instead of connecting. Black should simply have jumped to 1 in Dia. 6, though this would have permitted White the nice sequence to 8 at the top.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 3 (65 – 100)

Black 65 is another dubious move as it does not secure an eye. Safer would be moving out with 1 to 5 in Dia. 7.

Black 73. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 8 is the safe




Figure 3 (65 – 100)


move, but Black not only loses two stones in the centre but also suffers damage in the top corner. This would be unbearable, so he goes for all or nothing with 73.

White 88. Black's large group automatically dies when White lives.


Black 93 is sente. If White omits 94, Black sets up a troublesome capturing race with 1 to 7 in Dia. 9.

Black 95. Black's last chance is to build an enormous territory in the centre. Also, if White's centre group fails to escape or to make two eyes, White will have add a lot of stones to remove the captured black group from the board.

Black 97. Black hopes to make territory at the top as well, but this move is too loose, as it gives White a chance to counterattack later. Black should have played at 1 in Dia. 10. White escapes, but this cannot be helped.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10





Figure 4 (101 - 154)

Figure 4 (101 - 154)

White 8 is a severe move which exploits the looseness of Black 97. White could also win by playing more peacefully, for example, playing at 9, forcing Black to defend at 33, then switching to 'a' on the right side.

Black 11. Playing a hane on top, at 1 in Dia. 11, does not work any better. The best Black can do is to set up a ko with 3 to 13, but White sets up a second ko with 14 and 16, so he cannot lose.



Dia. 11

Dia. 12

The continuation from 12 is forced. After 32 White is one move ahead in the capturing race at the top.

Black finally calls it quits after White 54. If he connects at 1 in Dia. 12, White captures two stones with 2 to 6.

This game was a crushing win for Kato. It must be quite a while since so many stones have bit the dust in a title game.

Black resigns after White 154.

Game Three

White: Hashimoto Shoji

Black: Kato Masao

date: 4th April, 1979





Figure 1 (1 - 29)

Figure 1 (1 - 29)

White 4, 6, 8. This formation, a kind of mini-Chinese-style fuseki, is often seen recently. The 4th Honinbo, Dosaku, occasionally used it in two-stone handicap games (see Game 1 in 'Appreciating Famous Games').

Black 9. Fujisawa Shuko pointed out, and Kato agreed, that Black 'a' is bigger.

Black 25 is well-timed. Black is worried that if he plays 1 in Dia. 1 immediately, White may counter with 2 to 6. Once having exchanged 25 for 26, Black can counter White 'b' with Black 'c'.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (30 - 60)

Black 31. Black 'a' is also a good point, but Black does not want to permit White 31.

White 42. Attacking with 1 in Dia. 2 would be severer. If Black 2, cutting at 3 would work well. In the game Black builds thickness by moving out




Figure 2 (30 - 60)
40: connects

with a bamboo joint with 43 to 47.

White 48 is not as big as it looks. Even if Black plays 48, he is still open at the side at the top left. White 'b' is preferable to 48 (Black would continue with 'c').

Black 55 aims at wedging in at 'd', though 55 at 'e' would put more pressure on White's group to the left.

Figure 3 (61 - 100)

Black 65. Black 1 in Dia. 3 may seem more effective, but actually it is risky as White can press at 2. White neatly pushes through the middle with 8 to 12, then cuts off Black's group with 14.

White 70 is a slack move. If White moves out






Figure 3 (61 - 100)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', he easily erases Black's moyo at the bottom. However, Black 71 is a mistake in direction which fails to take advantage of White 70. Black should play 71 at 1 in Dia. 4, preventing White from connecting underneath here and driving him out into the centre. Black could then attack with 5, getting a good result.

White 72. White should omit this move if he is going to flee for safety with 82 at the top. The exchange for 73 is bad for White and gives Black an excellent continuation at 83. White seems to fall behind when Black plays 83.


White 84. White's strategy is to try and negate Black's potential at the bottom by making this area worthless territorially.

White 90 initiates a splitting attack. White 94 gains points in the corner, though permitting Black to hane at the head of two stones with 95

is painful. The alternative is to play 1 to 7 in Dia. 5.

Black 97 is thin. Kato commented that he should have extended solidly at 'd'.

From White 100 the game begins to take an untoward turn for Black.



Dia. 5





Figure 4 (101 - 131)

Figure 4 (101 - 131)

Black 7. Black does not feel like answering at the bottom. In exchange for giving White a big corner, he hopes to get all the centre.

White 14 is a troublesome move – Kato went wrong with his answer at 15. If he had cut at 1 in Dia. 6, he would have had a won game. After the sequence to 5, White has to play 6 to defend against Black 'a', so Black could switch to 29 in the figure.




Dia. 6

Black 17 compounds the error with 15 and is the losing move. Black should just connect at 19, making miai of 29 and 'a'. Cutting at 17 looks natural, but White has ready a snappy comeback with 20 and 22.

Black 25. Black 'b' only gives White an extra forcing move at 'c'.

Black 27. Black goes for centre territory with



Dia. 7 9: ko

27 and 29. This is a difficult decision for Black, as it is tempting to connect at 1 in Dia. 7.

Dia. 7. When White plays 2, Black must cut at 3 to be in the game, but then White sets up a nasty ko with 4 to 8. Black cannot afford to answer White 10 at 'a' as White will take the ko, then play 'b', ignoring any ko threat Black makes. Connecting at Black 'b' when White takes the ko is no good as White connects the ko and the six black stones cannot escape. Black 'c' is thwarted by White 'd'.

Black 31. Black hopes to gain compensation by destroying White's area at the bottom left while also settling his group, but ...

Figure 5 (132 - 172)

White counters by setting up a ko in the centre




Figure 5 (132 - 172)

ko: 40, 43, 46, 49, 52, 55, 58, 61; 67: connects

with 34 to 38. White captured at 30 in Figure 4 in order to make miai of this ko and blocking at 'a'. In retrospect, Black should have played more conservatively with 31, turning at 'a', for




Figure 6 (173 - 220)

105: takes 3 stones (below 76); 120: retakes




Figure 6 (221 - 276)

ko (right of 56): 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74; 76: connects; White wins and connects the ko.

example.

White 62, 64. Capturing the black intruders in the corner is sufficient - White can now cede the ko.

Figure 6 (173 - 220)

Black 73. Connecting at 90 is a little bigger.

Black 81. Playing at 82 first is correct, though this would not change the result.

Figure 7 (221 - 276)

This turned out to be another turbulent game. Hashimoto Shoji matched Kato in aggressiveness and thus kept alive his title chances.

White wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game Four


White: Kato Masao

Black: Hashimoto Shoji

date: 13th April, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 23)

White 14 challenges Black to invade at 15. White 'a' would give a leisurely game.



Dia. 1

Black 19. This counter-peep is probably a new move. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 1, the joseki to 10 will follow. If Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White captures with 'd', thanks to Δ .

White 20. If at 22, the threat of the cut in Dia. 1 is revived.

Forcing with 20 is a gain for White, but Black gets compensation by defending at 23 instead of 'b'.




Figure 1 (1 - 23)




Figure 2 (24 - 44)


Figure 2 (24 - 44)

White 28 is aggressive. The safe move is White 'a', but White does not want to let Black cross underneath at 28.


White 34 is bad - White should play at 1 in Dia. 2 immediately. The sequence to 8 is a likely continuation. Playing White 'a'-Black 'b'-White 'c' would now be very bad, but the result in the figure is equivalent to this. The natural continuation after 8 would be White 'd'-Black 'e'-White 'f', which compared to the figure represents a gain of about half a move.

Once having gone wrong with 34, White has no choice but to play 40 and 42 in order to spoil Black's shape.

Black 43 is a solid move which looks like setting up an effective splitting attack.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3






Figure 3 (45 - 64)



Dia. 4

7: ko



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (45 - 64)

In the play from 45 on, Black lets slip some good chances to secure his lead. First of all, with 45 -


Dia. 3. Jumping to 1 is better. If White 2, Black forces once with 3, then links up with 5.

Black 49 is also slack. Instead -


Dia. 4. Black 1 is more aggressive. If White 2, Black counters with 3 and 5, getting an excellent result to 11. Instead of 4 -

Dia. 5. If White extends at 1, Black gets a nice squeeze with 2 to 6, after which he could switch to 'a' in the figure.

Leading his group out with 50 and 52 relieves most of the pressure on White.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



A quiet moment from the Judan title match

Black 57 aims to keep things simple, but this is another slack move, as fighting spirit calls for Black to press at 'a'. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 6, Black pushes at 2, with the threat of Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' to come after White 3. Since White has a weak group in the centre, he could not play this way.

This means that White must start a fight by

cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 7, but there is no reason for Black to avoid this fight.

Black 57 is a surprisingly conservative move for Hashimoto Shoji, as he is not usually one to back away from a fight. White happily builds territory on the fourth line, putting the onus on Black to take compensation by attacking White's centre group.




Figure 4 (65 - 100)

Figure 4 (65 - 100)

Black 65. Attacking at 'a' seems more natural.

Black 69. Black 'b' is better - Black is playing conservatively, as if he were in the lead, but this is a mistake.

Black 71 is a sharp move, however. If White answers at 'c', Black attacks with 'a', White 'd', Black 'e'.

White has little trouble making his eyes. When Black takes away the eye on the side with 77, he makes one in the centre with 80 and 82 and seems assured of the other with 86.

White 90 shows that White is prepared to let Black live with 87. If White makes a pincer at 96 instead, Black can create trouble with Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'h'.

Figure 5 (101 - 152)

Black 3 is well-timed. If White connects at 'a', Black can cut at 10.

White 18 is a difficult point for White as he has no move which gives him good aji on the side.

Black 33 is an ominous move. White has to be careful as Black 37 is sente.

Black 35. Connecting at 36 is better.

Black 39 is the move that Black has been aiming at. Ironically, however, quietly filling in a liberty with 46 is a good move for White. If White played 46 at 47, Black 'b' would take the second eye of White's large group. When Black captures the group at the bottom with 47, White gets adequate compensation with 48 to 52.

Black 47. Playing at 1 in Dia. 8 does not work





Figure 5 (101 - 152)



Dia. 8




Figure 6 (153 - 200)

100: ko

now. White gets his second eye with 2, then when Black tries to kill the group at the bottom, he counters by cutting at 6. The presence of White 2 means that Black cannot play 7 at 8, so White gets his second eye here as well with 10 and 12.




Figure 7 (201 – 250)
ko: 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21

Figure 6 (153 – 200)

Black 57 and White 60 are exactly miai. White now has a secure lead.

Figure 7 (201 – 250), Figure 8 (251 – 299)

There is nothing to comment on in the endgame. When Hashimoto got off to a good start in this game, it began to look as if the title match would go the full distance, but in Figure 3 he let slip his chances to settle the position decisively in




Figure 8 (251 – 299)
60: ko (55); 64: right of 53; ko (over 63): 66, 69, 72, 75, 88; 90: connects (63); 98: at 55; 99: at 53; Black wins and connects the ko.

his favour. Kato took full advantage of his opponent's slack play to reverse the flow of the game, finally turning it into a solid victory for himself. He thus completed his second defence of the Judan title.

White wins by 10½ points.

Go World News

Continued from page 5

7th) W. Isele (W.Ger.): 5–4

T. Stacey (G.K.): 5–4

M. Kitsos (W.G.): 5–4

10th) H. Hasibeder (Aust.): 4–5

J. Hubert (France): 4–5

G. Beck (Aust.): 4–5

E. Novak (Aust.): 4–5

H. deVries (Holl.): 4–5

F. Hansen (Denmark): 4–5

16th) R. Koopman (Holl.): 3–6

A. Muller (Holl.): 3–6

18th) H. Kippe (W.G.): 2–7

I. Bisjak (Yugo.): 2–7

B. Wolter (W.G.): 2–7

Playoff

Mattern: 2–0

Schlemper: 1–1

Rehm: 0–2

A report on the Mattern – Schlemper game in the playoff is given on page 31.

Seminar on the Scientific Theory of Go

A seminar on the scientific theory of go was held at the European Go Congress from the 27th to the 29th July and reports were given by eleven people, most of whom work in teaching and research. The topics were:

Rules and algebraic definitions: A. Schilp, Dr. Liu

Psychology and Pedagogy, (Biology): Dr. Heine, Dr. Colombero

Mathematics and Statistics: Dr. Benson, Dr. Heine, Dr. Kramarczyk

Go Computer Programming: Bruce Wilcox, I. Pinkenburg

Most sessions had twenty to forty participants and there was much lively discussion about the importance of developing understanding between different branches of science. In order to make more progress with research into artificial intelligence and mathematical implications, it was felt that more studies of the game would be very use-

Continued on page 57

The 34th Honinbo Title

This series is the fourth title clash between Rin Kaiho and Kato Masao. They first met in 1969, in the 24th Honinbo title match, when Kato, then a twenty-two year old 5-dan, created a stir by becoming the youngest challenger in history. Kato got the worst of that encounter, losing 2-4, but he got his revenge seven years later, when he defeated Rin in the 14th Judan title. He again defeated Rin in the 16th Judan title last year. Recently Kato has done well against Rin, though the latter still leads in their overall tally, with twenty wins to sixteen at the start of this match. For Rin Kaiho, this is his first appearance in a Honinbo title match since his unsuccessful challenge to Ishida in 1973.

Game One

White: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Black: Kato Masao, Honinbo, Judan & Tengen

komi. 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 23rd, 24th May, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 28)

Figure 1 (1 - 28). *An unsatisfactory fuseki*

White 10. The Chinese-style fuseki with white is fairly unusual. The alternative for 10 is a splitting move at 'a'.

White 12. The result to 15 is a little unsatisfactory for White as Black gets a superb moyo, so making an approach move at the top at 21 seems preferable to 12. One likely continuation would

be Black 'b', White 15, Black 12, White 'c' (or 'd').

White 16. White has no choice but to invade, though this helps Black's moyo.

White 28 is the move that makes the game difficult for White. Since Black's moyo is bigger, there is no point in turning the game into a moyo contest. Rather, this is White's chance to come into Black's moyo. The best point seems to be White 'e', as Black will cap if White comes in any further. If Black 'f', White could move out with 'g' or he could regard 'e' as a forcing move and switch back to 28.




Figure 2 (29 - 51)

Figure 2 (29 - 51). *Trouble for White*

Black 29 is a slip: Black should play 31 first, as it is the focal point of his moyo. However, White also slips up in answering at 30, for 29 becomes a good move when Black plays 31. White should have played at 31 himself with 30. If next Black 30, White could play 40, forcing Black 43, then jump out at 'a'. This way Black's moyo would contract and White's expand, so White would recover from his inferior start.

White 32. With the addition of 29 and 31, White 'b' would now be too deep, as Black would cap at 'c'. White 'c' would be too shallow, however, as Black would be happy to defend at 'b'. Black caps anyway, at 33, but White does not come under as much pressure as he would have if he had played at 'b'.

Black 37 and 39 are severe moves, subjecting White to considerable pressure.

White just manages to move out with 40 to 44 but at a heavy cost. Black builds additional thickness in the centre with 45 and 47, then launches a severe attack on the group at the bottom with 49 and 51.




Figure 3 (52 - 100)
ko: 72, 79; 100 at 94

Figure 3 (52 - 100). *From bad to worse*

White 54. White cannot play 1 and 3 in Dia. 1 because his centre group will be cut off by Black 4.


White 58. This tesuji is a desperation measure. White's aim is not to capture Black but to sacrifice his group. He hopes to set up a capturing race in which he can squeeze from the outside.

Black 65. Black can kill White with 1 in Dia. 2, but then White counters with 2 to 6. He loses the capturing race, of course, but he would be able to build thickness and also secure the bottom left corner, getting a reasonable result.


Black 65 is Black's counter tesuji to 58. Black does not mind letting White live, so long as he stops him from squeezing. White does not have a good answer to 65. If he plays at 1 in Dia. 3, Black moves out in sente with 2 and 4, then captures with 6. He would also be left with the threat of Black 'a'.

White 66 is another desperation measure. White has fallen so far behind that simply getting two eyes is not enough.


White 74. If White captures at 'a', Black has a



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

good move at 'b', threatening to capture White's centre stones. Once again the ordinary move is not good enough for White, so he tries to create complications with 74.

White 76. White could also play 1 in Dia. 4. Black would answer at 2, giving up his corner stones in exchange for White's centre group, and should win.

White has no good ko threats, so Black has little trouble winning the ko up to 89. White does not even get sente, as he has to play 90 to help his centre group. On top of that, Black is able to set up another ko with 93 and 95. The odds are heavily weighted against White.



Dia. 4




Figure 4 (101 – 147)

Figure 4 (101 – 147). *A convincing win for Kato*

White 2. White has to take the ko. If he answers Black 1, Black's ko threats just get bigger and bigger.

White 12 optimistically prepares for an attack on Black's top left corner group. If the position were equal, White would defend one space above 13.

Black 13. If this invasion succeeds, the game will no longer even be countable.

White 28 stakes everything on an attempt to catch the two black stones below, so the game is finally over when Black escapes with 37.

There were two very instructive points in this game. The first came with White 30 in Figure 2, when Black missed the real focal point of his moyo and gave White a chance to catch up by sacrificing two stones, though this was not the kind of sacrifice that usually occurs to one early in a game. The other came with White 66 in Figure 3. Simply living with his group was not good enough, so White racked his brains to find something better. His efforts did not meet with success, but at least they showed commendable fighting spirit.

All the same, this must have been a discouraging start to the series for Rin. His strategic errors in the fuseki placed a burden on him which became heavier and heavier as the game progressed and which finally became too much to bear.

White resigns after Black 147.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 14 minutes

Black: 7 hours 2 minutes



Kato seems to be enjoying the post-game analysis with Shimamura 9-dan and Rin

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Rin Kaiho

date: 5th June, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 22). *A unique combination?*

Black 3, 5, 7. We again see the mini-Chinese-style pattern, this time played by Black. Kato with white counters with the full-fledged Chinese style, though not in the usual order of moves.





Figure 1 (1 – 22)

Another popular pattern is set in train at the top right by White 10 and Black 11. This could well be the first time that these three patterns have appeared in combination.


Black 19. Black now gets ideal shape, with a double-wing extension from a corner enclosure, though there is the drawback that he is biased towards one large territory.

Kato counters by starting a fight immediately with 20. The game is destined to be decided by this clash.


Rin meets Kato head-on by cutting at 21. Just for reference, Dia. 1 shows a strategy invented by Kajiwara – no one else could come up with this



Dia. 1



Dia. 3



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (23 – 45)

kind of large-scale sacrifice. Here the result to 11 would work ideally with Black's right side position, but there is no guarantee that White will play as dictated.

Figure 2 (23 – 45). *Aggressive play*

Kato: 'Black 29 is a real honte (proper move), but the usual strategy would be playing 1 and 3 in Dia. 2. Perhaps Rin felt that exchanging 1 for 2 was wasteful.'

Even if Black omits 29, he can safely counter White 4 in Dia. 2 with 5 and 7. Alternatively, if White plays the sharp-looking tesuji of 1 in Dia. 3, Black just manages to extricate himself with 2.

White 30–36. Kato's strength and aggressiveness are seen in this attacking sequence. He always plays all-out.

Black 41. Black does not want to play 42, because that would provoke White 'a', thus helping White to move into Black's moyo.

Black 45 is a probe which induces a fateful response from White.





Figure 3 (46 – 65)


Figure 3 (46 – 65). Kato's historic oversight

White 46. The correct move is White 'a'. Kato's aim in playing 46 was to prevent Black from getting any more sente moves against the corner group, but he overlooked the fact that Black 65 is sente.

Dia. 4. Black has the combination of 1 and 3. After White 6, Black has the clever move of 7, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b', thus terminating the corner with extreme prejudice.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Note that playing 5 here first is a mistake, as it lets White live with the 'under the stones' tesuji of 8 and 10 (if Black captures the five white stones, White plays in at 4, capturing three black stones). Kato completely missed the sequence in Dia. 4, a blunder which earns a place in go history.

When Kato played 46, Rin immediately realised what was up. He therefore set out to find the best way to take advantage of Kato's blind spot. The strategy he adopted was to try and make Kato attempt to capture the black group.

Thereafter, things could not have gone better if




Figure 4 (66 – 89)

Rin had been writing the script. Kato attacked in typical fashion with 58 etc., then completed his blockade of the black group with 64. Rin then sprung 65 on him – this move makes miai of killing the corner and living with 'b'.

Kato became aware of his mistake the moment Rin played 65 – his consternation can be imagined. It was too late for him to backtrack for he had already lost too much on the left side. Black 65 made a mockery of his whole strategy for his last half dozen moves.

Kato: 'When I saw Black 65, I suddenly recalled seeing, a long time ago, Rin and Yamabe going over this shape after a game. It's back to school for me.'



It's nice to win one

Figure 4 (66 – 89)

White does not feel like adding another stone in the corner now, so he plays 66. However, Black kills the corner with 67 and not even squeezing from the outside is worth anything for White. He plays on a bit, then resigns after 89.

This is the first two-day game in modern go history to end on the first day. A final comment from Otake, the artist at resigning a game:

'Hakone is close to Tokyo, so I went down to watch the game, but it was over by the time I got there. What a waste of time! All the same, Kato's timing for resigning was way out. He should either have resigned earlier or played on and settled the position more.'

White resigns after Black 89.

Time taken. White: 3 hours 19 minutes

Black: 4 hours 14 minutes

Game Three

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kato Masao

date: 13th, 14th June, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 35). An old-fashioned fuseki

White 8 is a leisurely pincer.

Black 11 is an old-fashioned move which has disappeared from modern komi go. Black expects White 'a' next, whereupon he intends to play 25. White switches to 12, however, so Black should have played 11 at 25.

Black 13. If one space to the right, White gets good shape with White 19, Black 14, White 30.

Black 19 is another old-fashioned move. In






Figure 1 (1 – 35)

fact, it is so long since it has appeared in a game that it was thought by many to be a new move, but Kano 9-dan points out in 'Igo Club' that it is described in detail in the 1933 'Igo Daijiten' (Encyclopedia of Go). To quote –

Dia. 1. When White crawls at 5 (instead of the hane at 6), answering at 6 is the correct order of moves, as this becomes the vital point. The result to 12 is good for Black. If White 'a', then Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. Instead of 7 –



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. If White 1 here, Black answers at 2. The result to 8 is considered slightly favourable for Black, though one has to take into account the position on the side.

Black 25. Black 26 is the proper move, but permitting White 'b' would be unbearable. Since Black disdains to defend, White promptly accepts the challenge, abandoning his original intention of playing a leisurely game.


White 30 is a tesuji. Playing a hane at 31 would clearly be bad, as Black would extend, leaving White with a defect in his shape. However, one might have expected White 1 in Dia. 3, but this is not good in this position. Firstly, Black will move out with 2 and 4, bringing pressure to bear on the two white stones; secondly, White cannot expect to make territory (or eye-shape) on the side as Black 'a' is sente against the corner. Dodging to 30 is therefore correct.

Black 31. Black 34 would be good for White as he can counter with White 31, Black 'c', White 'd'.

Black 35. Black 1 in Dia. 4 is wrong as it



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

gives White a good move at 2. Black 'a' next would be terrible shape, but if Black 3, White captures with 4.




Figure 2 (36 - 65)

Figure 2 (36 - 65). Storm clouds ahead

Black 41. Kato played this move because he wanted to be sure of taking the large point of 49, but later he regretted playing this way, as it left his centre stones too weak. Instead of 41 -


Dia. 5. The commonplace sequence of 1 to 5 is preferable. White gets the good point of 6, but then Black has the tesuji of 7, setting up a squeeze which gives him good shape at the bottom.

White 50. White sets out to take compensation for Black's profit with 49 by attacking Black's centre group. This starts some extremely complicated fighting in the centre.

Black 59 is good style. If White cuts at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black counters with 2 to 10. White therefore has to block on the outside with 60.

White 62 is the strongest move. If White simply plays at 'a', Black escapes with 'b'. Black's counter

to 62 is the combination of 63 and 65. At this stage this game also looked as if it might end on the first day.



Dia. 6






Figure 3 (66 - 86)

Figure 3 (66 - 86). A fair exchange

White 68 is a clever move. If Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White again forces with 2, then plays 6 to 8. Black cannot cut at 10 because of shortage of liberties, so he must play 9, letting White link up his stones in sente. White can then play 14,



Dia. 5




Dia. 7

forcing Black to live in gote, a very satisfactory result for White.

Black 69. Answering 68 directly is not profitable, so Black switches to 69. This is a perfectly-timed probe.

Dia. 8. If White 2, Black 3 makes miai of connecting at 'a' or 'b'. When White defends at 4, Black attacks the whole group with 5. Black has 'c' in reserve, so his own group is safe. The fate of the five black stones at the bottom is not important now.



Dia. 8

White plays safe with 70 to 74, so Black now has the escape route of 'a' in the centre in reserve. This means that he can fight back with 77 at the bottom.

Black 79. The sealed move on the first day.

White 82. White could save his centre stones with 82 at 83, but this would only give Black a good target to attack. Sacrificing the stones seems the wisest course. White is satisfied with breaking through at the bottom with 82 and with getting sente to play 86. This seems to be a reasonable result for both sides.

Figure 4 (87 – 124). A new battlefield

Black 87 is too loose – Black 'a' is correct.

Black 93. If at 1 in Dia. 9, White connects underneath in sente with 2 to 6, then attacks with 8. Black can save his group with 9 to 15, but at the cost of giving White a lot of profit on the left side. Black therefore prefers to play 93, sacrificing his group to the right. However, this gives White a bit of an edge.

White 100. If omitted, Black will attack with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd' and White will have trouble getting two eyes.

Black 107 initiates the second decisive fight of the game. Black is of course aiming at White's centre group as well as the stone on the side.






Figure 4 (87 – 124)




Dia. 9

White 118 was such a good move that Kato regretted playing 117. He commented that he should have played at 1 in Dia. 10. If White 2, Black plays 3 to 7, then presses at 9, posing a considerable threat to White's centre group.

Black 121. Black cannot play in Dia. 11 as he loses the fight after the sequence to 14. He therefore has to permit 122 and 124, moves which take the pressure off White.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11





Figure 5 (125 - 145)

Figure 5 (125 - 145). The losing move

Black 25. Black plays here to give his group a flexible shape. White companionably answers at 26, a move which looks natural but which is a mistake. Instead —

Dia. 12. Cutting at 1 is simpler. Black would play 2, so White could press at 3, taking a firm grip on the two black stones. This would have settled all three of White's insecure groups and given him the lead.




Dia. 12

The exchange of 25 for 26 means that Black can fight on equal terms here, so he pulls out his stone with 27.

White 32 is the losing move, according to Kato. White should give atari at 1 in *Dia. 13*; if Black 2, White could force with 3 and 5, then capture at 7, securing two of his groups. Black would then play 8 to capture the group on the left, but the sequence to 13 would give White enough compensation to keep him in the game.

When Black leads his two stones out with 39

and also lives with good aji on the side up to 45, the game is decided in his favour. White still has two groups in considerable trouble, quite a contrast to *Dia. 12*.



Dia. 13




Figure 6 (146 - 200)

61: connects; ko: 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93

Figure 6 (146 - 200). From bad to worse

White 62. If White persists in trying to save his group on the side, he will probably lose the centre group.

Black 67. If White 94, Black 75, White 74, White loses the atari at 97. In desperation, White resorts to a ko with 74. Incidentally, it now be-




Figure 7 (201 - 241)

comes clear that he should have played 94 in Figure 4 at 74 in this figure.

White finally has to submit with 94, so he ends up worse off for having started a ko, for he loses three stones in the centre and has to struggle to make a second eye at the top.

Figure 7 (201 - 241). A difficult game

Black 5. If at 6, then White stages an upset with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 5. Black therefore has to give up a few stones, but this does not affect the result.

This game stands out among recent tournament games for its difficulty. An extremely complicated fight at the bottom was succeeded by a clash on the left side which was almost as involved. In the space available, it has not been possible to give an adequate account of the intricacies of the play, but perhaps the reader has gained some insight into the tenacity and resourcefulness of these two players.

White resigns after Black 241.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 6 hours 53 minutes

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Rin Kaiho

date: 28th, 29th June, 1979

This was the crucial game of the title match — Kato had made a fine recovery in the third game after his debacle in the second game, so Rin had to stop him before he gained too much momentum. Moreover, for Rin the game meant the difference between leveling the series and facing his first kadoban — he just had to pull off a win.




Figure 1 (1 - 35)


Figure 1 (1 - 35). Another fighting start

Black 13. A pincer seems called for, as Black 'a' would make Black over-concentrated at the bottom.

White 22. White 'b' might be better.

Black 25. Black 26 is the standard move, but Black does not want to permit White 'b'. White 26 is a good move, however, as it combines attack and defence.

Black 35. An alternative for this move, suggested by both Takemiya and Fujisawa Shuko, is Black 1 in Dia. 1. Because of his cutting point, White has no way of sealing in Black ▲.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (36 - 73)


Figure 2 (36 - 73). *Black attacks strongly.*

Black 37. If at 38, White will extend at 37, setting up an atari at 45, as well as defending his cutting point.

Black 45. If Black blocks at 1 in Dia. 2, he can connect underneath with 3, but this is not very good. After Black 5, White can play down at 6, thus setting up the endgame sequence of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', picking up three stones through oi-otoshi.

After White gives atari at 42, the sequence to 56 seems inevitable. A large-scale exchange is effected, with Black taking the side and White the corner.

Black 57 is an aggressive move. The peaceful move of 1 in Dia. 3 would be good enough, as Black gets good shape with 3 and 5, but perhaps




Black did not like the prospect of White 6 to 10.

White 58 is the vital point here – the five black stones cannot attempt to escape.

Attacking at 59 is the natural continuation after 57, but Black will have to get a strong attack going on the black group to make up for permitting White 58.

Black 63. Black 1 in Dia. 4 looks natural, but White easily extricates himself with the sequence to 10.



White 64 is a well-timed probe. If Black plays 67 at 1 in Dia. 5, White will counter with a hane-komi at 2. If Black 3 and 5, White can play 6 and 8 in sente, threatening to squeeze with 'a'. If Black 9, White easily saves his group with 'b'. Black therefore has to submit with 67.

Figure 3 (74 - 112). *A premature ko*

Black is able to build thickness in the centre with 77 and 79, while White cannot get a full eye on the side. However, starting the ko immediately with 83 seems to be over-aggressive, as Black does not have much in the way of ko threats. Simply playing 83 at 91 at the top would be better: White




Figure 4 (74 - 112) ko: 87, 90

would have to forestall the ko by playing at 'a', so Black could then play 93. This would give Black the same result at the top as in the game but improve his position at the bottom. Since Black starts the ko immediately, White gains points when he dissolves the ko by capturing at 92 and also gains the threat of White 'b' for later.

Black 99. Black could get better shape by playing at 1 in Dia. 6. Since White 'a' is sente, White could capture five stones with 2, but these stones are no longer important. Moreover, Black could play 'b' in sente, getting excellent shape. Compare this result to the bad shape Black gets when White pushes through at 102.

White 112. The thickness this gives White in the centre seems to make the position slightly favourable for him.




Figure 5 (113 – 160). *A close game*

Black attacks strongly with 13 and 15, but White counters by taking profit with 16 to 20. Rin thought for seventy minutes about 21. Playing 21 at 22 lets White settle himself with some profit by connecting at 21, so Black prefers to drive White out into the centre. Playing 22 at 23 is different, as Black gets a good atari at 22, so White follows orders.




Figure 5 (113 – 160)

Black takes profit in the corner up to 29, but in exchange White gets an attack going on Black's centre group. This starts the fourth major clash of the game, though this one is settled without much fuss.

Black 57 is the biggest point. If omitted, White will play 1 in Dia. 7, followed by 3 and 5. White still threatens to clamp at 'a', so this result would be unbearable for Black.

White 60 is the next biggest point. The game is now very close.

Figure 6 (161 – 200). *Endgame subtleties*

Black 61. Playing at 64 is not worth it, as White takes sente with White 61, Black 63.

Black 79 aims at making territory in the centre, but the exchange for 80 seems dubious. Perhaps Black 79 should be at 99.

White 88–92. A neat endgame sequence. Giving up two stones is best for Black – if he plays 89 at 91, then after White 92, Black 90, White 89, he will have to add some stones here.

White 98. Rin apparently overlooked this move. For some time Rin had thought that he was ahead and though this move took him by surprise, he was confident that he retained the lead. Actually, however, White 98 secured the game for Kato.

Figure 7 (201 – 274). *A discouraging loss*

Right up to the end of the game Rin remained convinced that he had a win. The pressure of time trouble must have caused his counting to go astray.




Figure 6 (161 – 200)




Figure 7 (201 - 274)

ko (at 21): 24, 27, 30, 51; 73: connects

Kato, on the other hand, calculated the final margin exactly. This must have been a very painful loss for Rin, quite apart from its decisive influence on the series.

White wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 40 minutes

Black: 8 hours 55 minutes

Game Five

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kato Masao

date: 9th, 10th July, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 37). An early ko

White 10. As in the third game, Rin plays the Chinese-style fuseki with white.

White 16. A move invented by Otake Meijin. If Black 17 at 18, White invades at the 3-3 point.

White 26-36. White seems to be attaching too much importance to the ko. Since his ko threats at 26 and 32 lose points, the ko decreases in value. He could have considered playing 32 at 'a' or 36 at 'b'.

Figure 2 (38 - 79). White goes wrong.

Black 47 is a mistake in order. Black should first invade at 1 in Dia. 1, forcing White 2 (White will not play 6 because of the threat of Black 'a'), then give atari at 3. This way Black would get good aji in the corner with 5 to 9, whereas in the game White is left with the hanedashi at 'a'.




Figure 1 (1 - 37)

ko: 22, 25, 28, 31, 34





Figure 2 (38 - 79)

60: connects



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Black 55 is a standard move for settling stones inside the opponent's sphere of influence. Pulling back at 56 would make Black much too heavy.

White 76 is a bad move as it makes Black 79

possible. White should play at 1 in Dia. 2. Black would probably capture a stone with 2 to 6, but the result to 7 would be satisfactory for White.





Figure 3 (80 - 111)

Figure 3 (80 - 111). *Rin's do-or-die move*

White 84 looks stylish, but giving Black the opportunity to peep at the vital point of 85 is bad. White 84 should be at 85.

White 94 seems to be an oversight, for after defending at 95 Black has no trouble squashing White's attempt to live in the corner. Instead of 94, White should play immediately at 1 in Dia. 3. Black must capture with 2 and 4, so White should be able to live with the sequence to 11. After Black 99, White is clearly losing.

White 106 is a desperation measure which succeeds because of a mistake on Black's part. Before playing 109, Black must push through and peep with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. At this stage White would have no choice but to connect at 4, so Black could then play 5 and 7, giving up a few stones but taking sente (actually White 8



Dia. 3
10: connects

Dia. 4

would be too small to play this early). This result would be far better for Black than that in the game.




Figure 4 (112 - 155)


Figure 4 (112 - 155). *Rin's chance slips away.*

Black 19. The peep is now too late, as White can go for a large-scale exchange instead of connecting. This exchange is a considerable loss for Black and makes the game even.

White 38 is inexplicable — it does almost nothing for White and could well be the losing move. White has to defend at 44, so Black gets a chance to take the large point of 45 at the bottom. Instead of 38 —

Dia. 5. White's last chance to make a game of it is to rescue his stones at the bottom with 1. Black will attack with 2 and 4, but White does not seem in much danger.

White 46. White of course knows that he cannot live here, but with the game so unfavourable, he's got nothing to lose by trying.



Dia. 5






Figure 5 (156 - 201)

ko: 78, 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99; 101: connects



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 5 (156 - 201). Kato defends his title.

Just to demonstrate that White cannot live in the corner -

Dia. 6. If White 1, Black plays 2 to 6, catching White short of liberties.

Dia. 7. Playing 54 in Figure 4 at 1 here would not have helped. After 2 to 5 White is again caught short of liberties.

White sets up a ko with 74, but winning it would make no difference. For that matter, Black can afford to ignore White's ko threat at 100. When Black connects the ko, White finally has to admit defeat.

White resigns after Black 201.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 38 minutes

Black: 8 hours 5 minutes

Kato Masao has now held the Honinbo title for three successive terms, putting him in equal fourth place with Rin for total Honinbo titles won. To put his achievement in historical perspective, a complete record of the title-holders is given below.



The end of an unsuccessful challenge - Rin Kaiho played aggressively but was unable to topple Kato Honinbo from his throne.

Honinbo Title Winners

- 1st Honinbo (1941): Sekiyama Riichi 6-dan
- 2nd (1943): Hashimoto Uтарo 7-dan (won 1-0)
- 3rd (1945): Iwamoto Kaoru 7-dan (won 3-3, then 2-0)
- 4th (1947): Iwamoto (defeated Kitani 3-2)
- 5th (1950): Hashimoto Uтарo 8-dan (won 4-0)
- 6th (1951): Hashimoto (defeated Sakata 4-3)
- 7th (1952): Takagawa Kaku 7-dan (won 4-1)
- 8th (1953): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)
- 9th (1954): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)
- 10th (1955): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-0)
- 11th (1956): Takagawa (defeated Shimamura 4-2)
- 12th (1957): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Hosai 4-2)
- 13th (1958): Takagawa (defeated Sugiuchi 4-2)
- 14th (1959): Takagawa (defeated Kitani 4-2)
- 15th (1960): Takagawa (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-2)
- 16th (1961): Sakata Eio 9-dan (won 4-1)
- 17th (1962): Sakata (defeated Handa Dogen 4-1)
- 18th (1963): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-2)
- 19th (1964): Sakata (defeated Takagawa 4-0)
- 20th (1965): Sakata (defeated Yamabe 4-0)
- 21st (1966): Sakata (defeated Fujisawa Shuko 4-0)
- 22nd (1967): Sakata (defeated Rin Kaiho 4-1)
- 23rd (1968): Rin Kaiho 9-dan (won 4-3)
- 24th (1969): Rin (defeated Kato 4-2)
- 25th (1970): Rin (defeated Sakata 4-0)
- 26th (1971): Ishida Yoshio 7-dan (won 4-2)
- 27th (1972): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-3)
- 28th (1973): Ishida (defeated Rin 4-0)
- 29th (1974): Ishida (defeated Takemiya 4-3)
- 30th (1975): Ishida (defeated Sakata 4-3)
- 31st (1976): Takemiya Masaki 8-dan (won 4-1)
- 32nd (1977): Kato Masao 8-dan (won 4-1)
- 33rd (1978): Kato (defeated Ishida 4-3)
- 34th (1979): Kato (defeated Rin 4-1)

The 1979 European Championship

As reported in our last issue, three players tied for first place with 7-2 scores in the 23rd European Championship. In the playoff Jurgen Mattern of West Germany defeated Ronald Schlemper and Robert Rehm, both of Holland, to take first place, while Schlemper defeated Rehm to come second. Here is the crucial game of the playoff, with comments by Sakai Masanori 4-dan.

White: Jurgen Mattern 6-dan (West Germany)

Black: Ronald Schlemper 5-dan (Holland)

komi: 5

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 4. An unusual move, since the bottom left corner is open. Probably played to keep Black from getting the Chinese fuseki.

Black 9. Since Black wants sente to go to the bottom left, Dia. 1 would be natural here, but Black 9-19 are also perfectly good.

Dia. 1. Black trades 1 for 2, then plays 3 in the bottom left corner. Black 5 and 7 give him satisfactory shape. If White cuts with 6 at 'a', Black hanes at 6.

Black 26. Black is moving in the right direction, but he should move a line farther, to 1 in Dia. 2. Black 26 is a little heavy.

Dia. 2. If White plays 1, his group is lighter and he need not respond to Black 4. Instead, he can probe at 5, then perhaps close the top left corner with 38 in the figure.






Figure 1 (1 - 50)



Dia. 1

Black 3 occupies the bottom left corner.



Dia. 2

White 30. An overplay which White cannot follow up. If he wants to play in this area, he should start by peeping at 'a'. If he wants to defend the lower right, he should jump to 'b'. White 30 to 34 help Black solidify his territory.

White 36 should also be 'b'. White's play in this area has given him a compact group that is still vulnerable to attack.

Black 43 concentrates too much on the upper side. The threat of 49 next gives this move some value, but Black 48 would be better. If White answered at 43, Black could close the bottom left corner.

White 44. This would be a good chance to invade the left side at 'c' (or 48).


Black 45. This is pushing things too far. Black should have been elated with the 43-44 exchange and extended to 'd'. He loses a lot when White invades at 48.

Black 49. Another overplay.


White 50. Too submissive. White should peep at 'a'.

Dia. 3 (next page). If Black responds at 2, White need not hesitate to cut at 3. The ladder at 'a' is broken, and Black 'b' has no effect because of White 'c'.

Dia. 4. If Black connects at 1, he faces considerable danger from White 'a' or 'b' in the future. Cutting as in Dia. 3 would probably still work, but if White wants to play safe, he can defend at 2.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)


Black 51 and 53 make an interesting double threat.

Dia. 5. If White were to play 1 now, Black would hane at 2. White cannot block at 3 because of what happens in this diagram and the next.


Dia. 6. White may as well resign.

White 54. Defends against Dias. 5-6.

White 60. A beautiful way to protect the group on the left side. Professional-class.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

14: throws in; 15 captures; 17: connects



Dia. 7 5: connects

Black 61. The other half of the double threat.

Dia. 7. If White cuts at 1, Black squeezes with 2 and 4, then plays 6. White could kill this group if he did not have the triangled cutting stone to worry about, but with that stone there it looks as if Black lives. White 62 in the figure was therefore unavoidable.

White 64. Once again White should peep at 'a'. If Black 'b', 64 becomes unnecessary.


Black 65 could be left for later.

Black 71. Having taken the lead, Black becomes conservative. Black 'c', putting pressure on the group below, would be better.

White 72. An excellent capping attack. Black has to sacrifice a stone to get past it.

Black 81. Black should complete his escape by extending to 82 or jumping to 'd'. This would also put pressure on the white group in the lower right, making it hard for White to reduce Black's territory freely.

White 82. Good. White should also continue at



Dia. 8


100 before invading at 86.

Black 93. Perhaps Black was in time trouble. Instead of starting this sequence, he should have taken the key point at 100.

Dia. 8. If White answers 1 at 2, Black attacks at 3. While White is living on the right, Black will be building up territory at the bottom, and his center group will be safe. By leaving the left side unsettled, he leaves more chances for himself to play down it from above, and if White pushes through at 'a' —

Dia. 9. Black catches him in a ladder.

Black 97. With this move, Black loses the ladder of *Dia. 9* and thus has to defend at 99.



Dia. 9

White 100. The complexion of the game now changes considerably.
Figure 3 (101 – 170)

White 10. Before playing here, in fact before playing 8, White should have tested Black at 'a', leaving himself the option of giving atari at 58 or 59 instead of extending at 10. On the other hand, perhaps White 10 is good enough; it threatens both the center and the bottom. After some intervening moves, Black decides to defend the bottom with 17.




Figure 3 (101 – 170)

Black 27. Black 'b', to keep White from making a sente hane at the right of 25, would be better, but this is a minor issue because —

White 28 wins the game. Black's large group cannot be saved.

Black 41. Black attempts to counterattack against the white group in the lower right, but —


White 68 assures White of a second eye in the centre or on the right side. Black plays one more move, then resigns.

Black resigns at White 170.


Basic Fighting Techniques

Miyazawa Goro


This article is the third instalment in a systematic survey of the most important tesuji patterns and their application in actual play. A knowledge of these techniques is essential for success in middle game fighting and for coping with life-and-death emergencies. Although aimed at middle level kyu players, readers of all strengths should find the series useful for improving their tactical mastery of the game. Before reading the article, test yourself by tackling the problems below. The same tesuji pattern is involved in each.



Problem One
White to play



Problem Two
White to play



Problem Three
Black to play

Pattern Three: The Hane

The hane is a very simple move yet it can often be a very advanced technique. It is a useful tesuji for leading the opponent into shortage of liberties or for restricting the effectiveness of his stones.






Illustration One: Black to play


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point for rescuing Black's four endangered stones. White's two stones are useless because of shortage of liberties.



Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2



Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black connects at 3 and White cannot give atari. This example often comes up in actual play, so it is worth remembering.

Dia. 3. Black 1 is of course hopeless.






Illustration Two: Black to play

Black would like to capture the whole white group, not just three stones. How does he set about it?

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the wrong way: White has no trouble living.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: correct


Dia. 2. Black 1 exploits the special nature of the corner. If White 'a' after 3, then Black 'b'.




Problem One: White to play

White's two stones on the right cannot be helped, but something can be done for the other six that seem to be trapped. This problem is about 6-kyu level.


Dia. 1. White 1 shows little imagination. White can squeeze with 'a' and 'c', but Black secures his capture with 'b'.




Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3: oi-otoshi



Dia. 4: snapback

Dia. 2. White 1 is the tesuji: this move is flexible yet severe.

Dia. 3. If Black fights back with 2, White counters with 3 and 5, then catches White short of liberties by making a throw-in at 7 (this technique is called oi-otoshi). White can only get this result by starting with the hane.

Dia. 4. Black 2 is even easier to deal with, as White gets a snapback with 3.

Note that only the hane at 1 works. If White plays 3 first, Black plays 1 and wins.






Illustration Three: Black to play

White may seem safe enough, but there still is a lot of life left in the captured black stone.

Dia. 1. Cutting with 1 accomplishes nothing — Black has to come up with something better than this.




Dia. 1: useless




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the vital point of this shape. If White 2, Black counters with 3 and White has to play a ko. If White connects below 2 with 4, Black connects at 4 and wins the fight.


White 2 at 3 is the feeblest answer — Black just connects at 2.




Problem Two: White to play




Dia. 1: not enough



Dia. 2: failure



Dia. 3: the vital point



Dia. 4: success

White has to try and find a way to rescue his four cut off stones. This is a 2-kyu problem.


Dia. 1. White attempts to connect underneath with 1 but the best he can get is a ko. This is not good enough.

Dia. 2. White 1 is foiled by 2. White 'a' is sente, forcing Black 'b', but White cannot live with 'c' because of Black 'd'.


Dia. 3. The tesuji of 1 secures a connection.

Dia. 4. If Black 2, White has a follow-up tesuji at 3. If Black 4, then White 5 guarantees connection. If Black 2 at 5, White plays in at 4, again securing a connection.

Dia. 5. Actually White can also secure a connection by playing a hanekomi at 1. If Black 'a' after 3, White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', then White 'd'.




Dia. 5: alternative




Problem Three: Black to play


This is a rather difficult problem; it would




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 3: White dies



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 4: White dies

probably take a dan level player to solve it in actual play. How is Black to kill White?

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks good as it makes miai of connecting on both sides. However, White is relieved at being allowed to live with 2 and 4. If Black 1 at 2, White counters with 'a', Black 1, White 'b', setting up a snapback.

Dia. 2. Black must begin with the hane of 1.

If White 2, Black slips out with 3 and 5.

Dia. 3. If White 6, Black prevents him from getting an eye with 7 and 9. If White 6 at 7, Black still kills him with Black 6, White 9, Black 'a'.

Dia. 4. If White 2, Black destroys the eye with 3, then connects with 5. If White 2 at 3, Black 2 again kills White.


How to Improve at Fuseki (11)

Kato Honinbo

The Chinese-Style Fuseki (iii)

The top and the bottom

In my opinion, the Chinese-style fuseki is admirably suited to players who are confident in




Dia. 1

their fighting ability but who are not very good at fuseki or joseki.

Dia. 1. The only place that real josekis appear in this pattern is in the bottom right corner. Even there you only have to master the variations of the one-space high approach move. Apart from that, the whole board is just like one joseki, so you can plunge right into the middle game without having to worry about any troublesome fuseki theory. The Chinese-style is probably the easiest fuseki pattern to master.

As mentioned in the first instalment on this pattern, one thing that you must keep in mind is that the top and the bottom are miai. For example, if White occupies the top with 1 to 5 in the diagram, Black must play at 6 at the bottom. Note that Black does not enclose the bottom right corner with 'a' — the correct strategy is to make the double wing formation based on the 3—4 stone in the corner.

Dia. 2. If White plays at 1 at the bottom, Black



Dia. 2


must occupy the top with 4. Black 'a' next would give Black an excellent position, so making an approach move at 5 is urgent (White could exchange 'b' for Black 'c' first). We have already discussed how Black answers White 5.

Recently the pattern to 5 in Dia. 1 is most commonly seen in professional games. However, there are alternatives to Black 6 at the bottom. Black can go one space further to 'b' or he could play 'c' first, then take up position with 6 or 'b'. Let's look closely at the differences between these moves.


A one-line difference

Dia. 3. When Black has extended to ▲ on the star-point, it is easy for White to enter at 1. If the joseki to 8 follows, White now has a good move at 9. White would usually be reluctant to play here, as it helps Black to solidify his position, but here that does not matter because of the narrowness of the space between ▲ and 10 and 12. Black ▲ at 'a' would of course be preferable.

Dia. 4. White could also simply play at 1, omitting the approach move, though he must be prepared for Black to apply pressure from above with 2. White defends at 3, aiming at the counterattack



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

with White 'a', but Black can forestall him by playing Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. This builds thickness for Black and is virtually sente, leading to the conclusion that White 3 is a questionable move. Playing solidly at 'e' instead seems preferable.

I have tried White 1, Black 2, White 3 or 'e', but this sequence is not often seen now. The problem is the forcing move of Black 2. Considering this —

Dia. 5. Sakata Eio's opinion is that the more conservative move of 1 is better. Here he tries it against Kudo 9-dan in their 1978 Meijin league game.




Dia. 5


Black switches to the top with 2 to 6, so White is able to enter at the bottom right with 7. After the familiar joseki to 14, White settles himself solidly on the side with 15 and 17, then attaches at 19. The development to 29, with the meaning of ▲ becoming a little blurred, seems to be just what White wants.

Dia. 6. When Black has extended one line further with ▲, White is reluctant to make an approach move in the bottom right corner, in contrast to Dia. 3. Most often White will play a probing move at 1 or 'a'. The question of whether 1 or 'a' is better is another difficult problem.

Black 2, applying aerial pressure, is still a good point. Black aims next at attaching at 'a' in order to set up a squeeze. Defending at White 'b' is the proper move, but White can hardly play at such a leisurely pace, so he will probably come in at 'c'.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Another good strategy is to enclose the corner with 1 or 'a', looking upon the ▲ △ exchange as a gain for Black. The question of who gets to take the good point of 'b' now has an important influence on the game. Instead of the large knight's move —

Dia. 8. The more conservative move of 1 is also often seen. The position here is from the first game of the 2nd Kisei title match (see GW6, p. 24). Fujisawa Shuko was black and I was white.

White stores up strength with 1 in order to




Dia. 8

play forcefully at the bottom. When Black plays 2 (Black 'a' and 'b' are also possible), White promptly invades at 3. White could also play at 'a' with 3, but challenging Black to a fight feels right since ▲ is one space wider. If White does play 'a', Black ▲ will work well.


Black 4 combines attack and defence. This move makes good use of the Chinese-style pattern, while simply enclosing at 'a' would lack forcefulness. Black 4 at 'c' has also been played.

A large-scale fight starts when both sides move out into the centre. The tendency for the fighting to spread over the whole board is one of the features of the Chinese-style pattern.

Dia. 9. Playing at 1 is also possible (if the white stone is at 'a', then Black 'b'). If White 2, then Black takes up position with 3 (or 'c'), occupying the bottom. If next White 4, Black answers at 5, getting good shape at the bottom. However, this result is not very likely.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 10. White usually counters with a pincer at 2. Black's best move is to take the corner with 3, so the positions are reversed, with White taking the side. White forces with 12, then builds thickness with 14. This sequence has appeared in countless games. If White simply plays 12 at 14, Black gets a good move at 12 or 'a'. Instead of 13 —


Dia. 11. Fujisawa Shuko believes that the diagonal move of 1 is superior. If White 2, Black builds up his position on the right with 3.

One has to agree that Black 1 and 3 make ideal shape on the right side, but Black has played an


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Good and Bad Style


Problem: Black to play




61




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


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


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
Vulgar style




If Black 1, White cuts at 2, Black must play at 'a' next, so White captures at 'b'.




Black 1 and 3 just give White a helping hand to live.



If Black 1, White makes gomoku-nakade with 2, killing Black by reducing him to one large eye.




Black 1 and 3 may be sente, but White is relieved to end up with five points of territory.




If Black 1, White lives with 2. If Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', then White 'e'.


Correct style




Black 1 may be bad shape but here it is the correct move.




White has to retreat with 2, so Black secures the corner territory with 3.




Venturing in a little further with 1 is the answer. White cannot live.




If White 2, Black stops him from getting an eye with 3.




Black 1 is the vital point.




White cannot reduce Black to one eye now.




If Black goes in at 1, this all becomes black territory.



White dies as he cannot play at 'a' after Black 3. If White 2 at 'a', then Black 2.



Black 1 is the vital point for attacking this group.





2 and 3 are miai, so White dies.

How Would You Play Here?

Miyamoto Naoki

Problem 1. White to play


There was a famous thirty-game match in 1853 between Honinbo Shusaku and Ota Yuzo. They began on even terms, but after seventeen games Shusaku had taken a four-game lead (10 wins, 6 losses, 1 draw) and under the conditions of the match Yuzo was forced to accept a *sen-ai-sen* handicap, playing black two games out of three from then on. Ultimately he broke off the match, after drawing with white in the twenty-third game. The position at right comes from the seventeenth game. Shusaku, with white, is already in the lead. What move makes his lead firm? Choose from A to D.



Problem 2. Black to play


This time Black is in the lead, which is not surprising since this is a three-stone handicap game. What move secures his lead best? Choose from A to D.

Problem 1. A is correct.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Shusaku played White 1 and 3, taking profit while stopping a black placement at 'a'. Since Black could not afford to let White push through and cut (White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd') he had to defend at 4. White 1 and 3 thus became sente.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. The placement at 1 would be a big move for Black. It threatens to link at either 6 or 7. To capture it, White has to force with 2 and 4, then block at 6, but Black gets a solid pon-nuki in sente with 7 and 9. Playing 1 and 3 in the previous diagram before Black gets a chance to play 1 in this shows sharp timing.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. To start a fight with White B would be unwise. If Black responds at 'a', White has no immediate good reply.

White C looks nice, but that is all. If Black jumps to 'b', White C will probably turn out to be more a burden than an asset.

White D is a fine move, but if White plays it now, Black will make the placement at 'c'. As we shall see, Shusaku played D directly after Dia. 1.




Figure 1 (1 - 83)

Figure 1. A letter Shusaku wrote to his father about this game contained the following remark. 'White 10, 12, and 14 are new moves. It took me six hours to think of them.' Considerable effort was going into this game.




Figure 2 (1 - 14)

Figure 2. From the same letter: 'When Black played 4, I counted White already in the lead so I stabilized with White 5. That put me four games ahead in the match. I am rather proud of this game.' In other words, when he played White 5 he had already read out victory. Yuzo tried to rally in the center, but —





Figure 3 (15 - 31)


Figure 3. White had no weak groups, so he was able to concentrate on reducing Black's center. With 21 he also broke into the left side. White 23 in reply to 22 is a tesuji; if Black plays 24 at 'a', White extends to 28. Capturing the lone black stone with 29 and 31 was thick end-game play, backed up by accurate calculation. Black had no chance to catch up.

Problem 2. B is correct.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Calmly jumping to 1 is the best move. It approaches White's center framework while defending against such white moves on the right as 'a' and 'b'. White's center may appear large, but it is at just such times that one must stay calm and play quiet moves like 1.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Since Black 1 keeps White out of the right side, all he can do is play for the center with, for example, White 2, but Black jumps again to 3, enlarging his right side still further. If White plays 2 at 3, Black should play 2, again advancing slowly. He has lots of solid territory, so he should maintain this type of slow, steady movement.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black A is the worst move, neither increasing Black's territory nor having any effect on White.

Black C is mistimed. White will invade the right side at 'a'.

Black D worries too much about White's center. There is no need to go this far.

Dia. 4. If Black plays D in *Dia. 3*, he becomes vulnerable to a large-scale attack, starting in-




Dia. 4

directly perhaps with White 1. The sequence from 2 to 12 is a joseki, but White splits Black with 13. This is how handicap games are lost. Black may have other responses than 2, but the point to be made is that it is dangerous, especially in handicap go, to play stones like the tri-angled one that risk being cut off.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* May 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

Joseki Amateurs Don't Know

Abe Yoshiteru, 8-dan








Figure 1 (1 – 25)

Black: Kano 9-dan. White: Iwata 9-dan.

Dia. 2. Fair. If Black simply plays 1, White can invade at 2 and extend to 4. There may be nothing wrong with that, but –



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Effective. If Black has made the triangled exchanges before White invades, he can check him at 2. This is clearly more effective, which shows the value of those exchanges.

Figure 2. This game was played in August 1977 in the Oza tournament. Fujisawa Shuko commented that defending the upper side with Black 17 was a mistake; if Black had extended down the right side to 'a' he would have had the lead. White might then invade at 17, but Black's two stones are light, and he can do with them whatever he wants.





Figure 2 (1 – 18)

Black: Abe 8-dan. White: Kitamura 5-dan



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Attachment. White, for his part, should not have pushed at 'a'. That causes him a loss. Invading at 4 directly after the attachment at 2 is correct. If the enclosure to the left were white, 4 at 'b' would be better, a pincer attack.




Figure 3 (1 – 20)

Black: Abe 7-dan. White: Nakamura 8-dan.

Figure 3. I tried this pattern in the 1973

All-Japan First Place Tournament, too. Once again Black 11 faced a black enclosure in the top right corner. White responded correctly at 12 and 14, I thought, but some subsequent mistakes

brought about his early resignation. Black 11 is, as said before, a move with a good winning record.

(‘Shukan Go’. Translated by James Davies)

The Pillbox Formation

Sakanoue Kanae

The idea of letting Black place his handicap stones wherever he likes, to suit his own style of play, has occurred to many people. In a nine-stone game, I consider the starting formation shown in Figure A, in which Black




Figure A

makes ‘pillbox’ emplacements in two corners, a formidable one. The pillbox shape gives Black strong outside thickness, and White cannot live independently in the corner. If Black can use his thickness plus his remaining three handicap stones to obtain a fifty-fifty result on the outside, he should win by the amount of territory left inside the pillboxes. The key to this strategy is probably to keep from developing weak groups. Once Black accustoms himself to it, I think Figure A gives him far more than the usual nine-stone advantage.

My opponent in this game, who is in fact about nine stones weaker than I, adopted the pillbox formation at my suggestion. We shall see how he fared.


Black: Sakai Minoru

White: Sakanoue Kanae


Figure 1 (1 – 21)

Black led off with a forceful contact play at 2, but I do not really approve of it. A pincer as in Dia. 1, functioning also as an extension from the pillbox, would have been better.

Black 6 was a good move, but not a superlative move. There can hardly be any superlative moves in an area as undefined as the lower left. Black 1 in Dia. 2, a well-balanced extension, is my suggestion.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2






Figure 1 (1 – 21)

White 7 was certainly not a strong stone, so it was a pity to attach Black 8 to it, but still, through 14 Black had made no dreadful mistakes.


Since White is not supposed to be able to live inside the pillbox, White 17 may seem strange, but it was not played to fake Black out. It was a probe to see how he would capture. If he played Black 1 in Dia. 3, I was



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


planning to trade 2 for 3, then extend to 4. Black 1 in Dia. 4 would probably have been the strongest response. If Black also plays 3, White can neither live in the corner nor do much from the outside.

Black, however, made the slightly odd extension to 18 and lost his chance to kill the corner. If he had tried to kill it by answering White 19 at 21, White could have broken out as shown in Dia. 5.

Figure 2 (22 – 42)

White having neglected to extend to 22 on the lower side, this should have been a good point for Black, but Black 'a' would have been better, and Black 37, attacking the lower side on a large scale, better still.

White 23 was an attempt to shake things up a bit, but it was too low to have much power. Black cut White's connections with 24, but if he was going to lead White into the corner, Black 1 in Dia. 6 was preferable. After White 2,



Dia. 6





Figure 2 (22 – 42)


Black has a solid shape. The shape he made in the game lacked this solidity.

Black 28, however, was too solid. It is not that White cannot cut here, but if Black wants to defend, Black 37 defends more efficiently than 28. One must always strive for efficiency.

White 33 was another probe. Conditioned reflexes may have made Black play 34, but if he wanted to thwart White's aim he should have descended at 1 in Dia. 7. White 35 would seem



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

to ask for Black 1 in Dia. 8, but if Black plays that way, White can make good shape on the outside with 2 and 4. Black 36 prepared for the attack that followed with 38 to 42.

Figure 3 (43 – 76) (next page)

Even with the benefit of kindness, the white group on the upper side had at most one eye, so it had to run for its life with 43 to 49. Black 50 and 52 pursued it in good attacking style, but there was in reality a certain lack of purpose to these moves. Such moves can, if worst comes to worst, end up being valueless.





Figure 3 (43 - 76)




Dia. 9

How about Black 1 in Dia. 9? Black plays here and waits to see where White will go. If he jumps to 2, Black 3 and 5 work well — there is no way these stones can become valueless. They make territory, and also make use of Black's thick formation on the lower side.

In the actual game, White slipped past Black to the key point at 53. Then Black apparently became confused by White 57 and made several strange moves, starting with 58. By pushing with 66, 68 etc. he succeeded in dividing White, but at the cost of having White play 73 and 75.

Figure 4 (77 - 100)

The game had become a battle for the center, with Black trying to recoup the considerable loss he had suffered on the left side and White trying to dodge him. I was on the verge of connecting at 1 in Dia. 10 when I saw that Black could cut



Dia. 10

with 2 and 4. Shifting in mid-air, I played White 77. Black 78 and 80 were then natural, and they put White in a truly difficult position. At such times does one resort to trickery. White 81 and 83 were played with the bad intention of faking through, and my opponent was kind enough to go along with them at 84. If he had read a bit deeper, he would have seen that Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 11 were necessary. It looks as if White can escape





Figure 4 (77 - 100) 88 connects.



Dia. 11

to the right with 4 and 6, but Black peeps at 7 and White is in trouble again.

Black 90 was also wrong; it should have been 91, of course. Taking advantage of these two mistakes, White broke up Black's lower side, but Black 98 renewed the pressure on the center.

Figure 5 (101 – 130)

White 1, my defense in the center, did not really make two eyes. Black should have kept attacking. Black 'a', for example, would not have risked anything.

Black 2 in the lower left, however, was an interesting move. There was no way for White to capture this group without giving up the corner.

Figure 6 (131 – 163)

By now we were in the endgame, and Black was still well ahead. It was a relief to be able to play White 31. White 33 invited Black 34 and 36,




Figure 5 (101 – 130)





Figure 6 (131 – 163)

and Black promptly answered the invitation. Following your opponent around like this is one of the worst things you can do. Black should have played 47, or 'a' (making a ko of the corner). What with this and that, the game was becoming close.

Figure 7 (164 – 200) (page 50)

If Black 64 had been played before White Δ , White would not have been able to get a nice unconditional life with 65–69. Black 70 and 72 were not small, but as it turned out, Black 'a' would have been better.

When I played White 73, I began to sniff the scent of an upset. I saw White 81–89, that is. This was nothing to be proud of, because it meant counting on an enemy mistake, but it is typical of what happens in nine-stone games. If Black had played 82 at 1 in Dia. 12 he







Figure 7 (164 - 200)




Dia. 13

at least have cut his losses. Well, perhaps it is good for Black to get tripped up like this (an easy thing for White to say), because go is first and foremost a reading contest, and the more often Black is tripped up, the more likely he is to develop the habit of reading carefully. Anyhow, White was finally in the lead, by a narrow margin.

Figure 8 (201 - 275)

Only small places were left; just one of them deserves mention, namely White 15 etc. in the upper left. Black 20 was the correct reply to White 19. If Black had tried to save everything with 1 in Dia. 14, he would have lost much more. White 21 captured



Dia. 14

3 connects

three stones, but Black could not help it, and from White's point of view, it was no big accomplishment.

Black lost this game, but his defeat cannot be blamed on the initial pillbox handicap formation.

White wins by 8 points.

(Note: According to Hayashi's *Igo Hyakka Jiten*, the pillbox formation was introduced by Hashimoto Utaro and developed by Hasegawa Akira

during the shin-fuseki period. The name 'pill-box' was bestowed on it by Go Seigen from its resemblance to a machine-gun emplacement.)




Figure 8 (201 - 275)

14 connects at 9. 52 takes ko beside 49.


55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70: ko. 72 connects at 49.

('Gekkan Gogaku' April 1979. Translated by J. Davies)


Life and Death Page

Here are six groups to save and six to kill, and for an added touch of realism, one problem in each of the six has no solution. The rest


all have unconditional solutions. Answers are on the next two pages.




1. Black to live




2. Black to live




3. Black to live




4. Black to live




5. Black to live




6. Black to live




7. Black to kill




8. Black to kill




9. Black to kill



10. Black to kill




11. Black to kill



12. Black to kill


Solutions

1. Black lives




Black 1 is humble and magnificent. After 3, Black has his two eyes and White cannot cut at x.

2. Black lives




If Black wants to live unconditionally, his only choice is the diagonal move at 1. That gives him two sure eyes.


3. Black lives




Black 1 is the only move with any chance of succeeding, and succeed it does, thanks to the snapback created by 3.



Although Black 1 is the usual tesuji in this shape, here it fails. If Black next plays 'a', White replies at 'b'.




Attaching with Black 1 gives a ko. If White plays 2 at 3, then Black 2, White 5, Black 4, White 'a' gives a seki.




If Black hanes from the edge, White will reply at 2 (not 'a!') and that will be that.

4. Black lives




Black 1 threatens 2, and if White plays there, Black plays 3. White 4 and Black 5 then create another snapback.

5. Black lives




Cutting at 1 is a beautiful, tempo-gaining sacrifice. White has to reply at 2, and Black lives with 3 and 5.


6. No solution




Black 1 looks plausible, but White 2 and 4 refute it. Next if Black 'a', White 'b'.



Black 1 here is a bit too obvious. White 2 is the key point, and the result is a ko.




If White tries to resist with 2, Black extends at 3 and captures three stones.




Descending at 1 also fails, as White 2 and 4 catch Black in a shortage of liberties, and if Black plays 1 at 4, White answers at 1.

7. White dies




The throw-in at 1 solves the problem. If White 'a', then Black 'b', naturally. If White 2, Black 3 is instant death.




Black 1 in the center is precipitous. White 2 and 4 mean a ko.

8. White dies




Black attacks from within at 1. If White captures, Black 3 gives him a common dead shape.




To attack from without is to earn White's undying gratitude. This shape is a seki.

9. No solution




Any attempt to kill has to start with Black 1, but White 2 and 4 form a half eye.




And if Black kills the eye with 5, White gives atari at 6. Connecting at 7 only increases Black's loss.

10. White dies




Black 1 forces White 2, and Black 3 finishes the job. A simple combination, but easy to overlook.




If Black starts with 1, White lives with 2. Note that 2 must not be played at 'a' (or Black will play 2).

11. White dies




Black 1 is the killing move, and 3 the necessary continuation. If White 'a', Black links with 'b', which is fortunately an atari.




Black muffs it if he pushes through at 1. White 2 gives a ko.

12. White dies



There is death in the hane, as the saying goes. If White responds at 2, Black 3 and 5 do him in.




If White responds with 2 here, Black plays the same combination in reverse.

(From a supplement to the June 1979 'Gekkan Gogaku')

Correcting the Mistake


Kato Honinbo



The Mistake

White 1 is from an amateur game I observed at the Nihon Kiin. It is an overplay, but this time, for a change, let's consider not how to correct it but how to take advantage of it.


Black's actual moves were 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, a somewhat cumbersome combination. After some



Dia. 1

hard thought, White played 4 to induce 5 and 6. His overplay was succeeding.


White 1 in Dia. 2, which would have taken much less thought, would have been just as good. Black wants to attack either the two triangled stones on the lower side or the two stones standing on the left side, but now neither attack seems likely to materialize. If anything, it is



Dia. 2

Black's isolated stone on the left that will be attacked. Clearly something is wrong with the way Black has played.


The inevitable kibitzer was there to give advice after the game was over. 'Following Black 1 and White 2 in Dia. 3, I would have leaned on



Dia. 3

White at 3. That way, the triangled stone would be safe and Black wouldn't get into trouble.'


True, but White wouldn't be in any trouble either. Since the speaker was familiar with leaning attacks, I wonder why he didn't think of leaning against the other side with Black 1 in Dia. 4. White 2 to Black 5 are standard, and now if White plays 6, Black can attack the triangled stones with 7, simultaneously building a huge framework on the right side. Whether



Dia. 4


White will actually play 6 or not is another question, but at least this idea should have occurred to Black.

Instead of 6 in Dia. 4, White may play 1



Dia. 5

and 3 in Dia. 5. Black should reply with 4 and 6. That leaves him in a good position to attack both the left and lower sides. In particular Black 'a' remains an excellent move if he gets a chance to play it. As long as White has these two groups to worry about, he is not going to be able to do much about the right side. That relationship is the important thing to understand.



Dia. 6


White may also push at 1 in Dia. 6. Black should naturally hane at 2. White will jump to 3, and Black can fight with 4. Don't ask me how this fight will continue, but Black's strategy should still be to build up his framework on the right side while attacking the two stones on the lower side. That is the main point I want to make, and if you understand it, you will understand why he should lean at the triangled stone and not at 'a'.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* Aug. 1979. Translated by J. Davies)


Small-Board Problems

James Davies


More problems on six-by-six boards. To solve most of them, you need to read only three moves ahead: your first move, the enemy's response(s), and your winning counter-response(s). Assume that no prisoners have been captured.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3



Problem 4



Problem 5




Problem 6


- Problem 1. White to play and win.
- Problem 2. White to play and win.
- Problem 3. Black to play and win.
- Problem 4. Black to play and win.
- Problem 5. White to play and win.
- Problem 6. White to play and win.

ANSWERS

1. Answer. White 1 is the move. If Black links at 2, White gives atari at 3. If Black plays 2 at 3, White splits him at 2 and although Black may be able to live on one side, he will die on the other, leaving White in possession of two-thirds of the board.



1. Answer




Dia. 1


ko: 8, 11

Dia. 1: continuation. Black's strongest continuation from the answer diagram is to play 4 and fight the ko. He loses it, and the game, but at least he gets to live with 12–16. If he plays 4 at 5, White 12 kills everything.

Dia. 2: failure. Connecting solidly with White 1 is unimaginative, and loses by 5 points.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: failure. Descending at White 1 is perhaps over-imaginative. Black pushes through with 2 and 4 and — well, the rest is trivial.


2. Answer. White must make a forcing move at 1, then block at 3.



2. Answer



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 1: continuation. Thanks to the 1–2 exchange, Black 4 becomes gote and White wins by 4 points. Black 7, White 6 would give White another 4-point win.

Dia. 2: failure. If White neglects the forcing move and blocks at 1 directly, Black 2 roughly doubles in value. From this point on there are several variations, but they all lead to the same result: a 4-point defeat for White.


3. Answer. Black 1 is all there is to it. If White defends at 2, Black 3 wins by two points, 10 to 8.



3. Answer



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Dia. 1: variation. If White makes the three-point play in the lower right, Black makes a five-point play by descending at 4. That puts him 4 points ahead.

Dia. 2: failure. If Black hanes at 1, the upper left and lower right become identical miai and the game ends in a 9–9 draw.

4. Answer. Black 1 and 3 create a seki. White is reduced to just one point (for capturing Black 5).



4. Answer




Dia. 1


6 takes ko

Dia. 1: variation. If White answers Black's placement like this, Black 2 starts a ko. Black has one ko threat at 4 (or 5) and that is all he needs. When he retakes the ko with 6, White may as well resign.

5. Answer. White 1, sacrificing two stones, may seem like sheer madness.




5. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: continuation. But when White sacrifices a third stone at 3, the method in the madness becomes clear. Black can play 4 at 5 for a ko, but he obviously has no ko threats. White wins the whole board.


6. Answer. Thrusting in at White 1 is the key move. Black has three or four conceivable replies, but as the following diagrams show, they all lose.




6. Answer




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 1: first variation. Suppose Black connects at 1. White gives atari at 2, plays 4 and 6 in sente, then connects at 8 and wins by one point, 10 to 9. Be careful not to play 8 at 9, for Black will then make a throw-in at 8, with disastrous consequences.

Dia. 2: second variation. If Black plays 1 here (to keep White 9 from being sente), White plays 2 and 4, then connects at 6. Once again, he wins by one point. Black 1 at 9 similarly loses.

Dia. 3: third variation. What if Black hanes at 1? White captures a stone with 2-6. In the upper left Black cannot play 'a' — White descends

at 'b' and Black has no move — so the best he can do is Black 'b', White 'a', but that leaves White comfortably ahead.

Dia. 4: failure. If White fails to see the 'a-b' business in Dia. 3 and defends at 1, White 3 becomes gote and White will lose the game by one point.


Dia. 5: failure. Grabbing a stone with 1 and 3 in this diagram is another way to lose. Black grabs back with 4 and 6. That this puts him one point ahead is left to the reader's verification. It is possible, however, to play White 1, Black 2, White 5 and win by reverting to Dia. 2.

Continued from page 38

extra move there. If there is an urgent point elsewhere, taking sente with 13 in Dia. 10 should be a reasonable move. Also, when Black plays 1 here, White might prevent him from playing 3 by omitting 2 and playing White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' instead.

In any case, Black has to be prepared for the pincer at 2 when he plays 1 in Dia. 10.

This concludes our discussion of the Chinese-style fuseki pattern. While the pattern is perhaps not quite as easy as I have implied above, it should still be relatively straightforward to use it in your own games. One advantage it does have is that



Dia. 11

there is a wealth of study material from current professional go.

(*'Igo Club'*, November 1978)

Go World News

Continued from page 15

ful. Of especial interest were the demonstrations given by Bruce Wilcox of the progress achieved with computer programming.

It is planned to publish the proceedings and reports in about six months time.

(*Report from Dr. Klaus Heine*)

18th Judan Tournament

Otake Meijin has reached the final in the winners' section of the 18th Judan title. His opponent there will be the winner of the semifinal be-

tween Kudo Norio 9-dan and Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan. In the parallel losers' section, Cho Chikun, Ishida Yoshio, Hashimoto Shoji and Ishida Akira have reached the 3rd last round.

1979 Katowice International Go Meeting

This year's International Go Meeting, held every September at Katowice in southern Poland, was a great success. It was attended by 26 Poles, 9 Czechs, 4 East Germans, 2 Hungarians and 5 British. The main event was an eight-round handicap tournament, which was won by Matthew Macfadyen of Britain with 7 wins. Second was Janusz Kraszek 4-dan of Warsaw.

Some Senryu about Go

William Pinckard

A basic tenet of Buddhist philosophy holds that the cause of all suffering is the inability to perceive the real nature of things. This inability arises in the human species because of an innate tendency toward clinging, or greed, which beclouds the senses, producing a state of confusion called in Sanskrit *avidya*, 'lack of brightness'. When the clinging tendency is cut off *avidya* becomes *vidya*, 'brightness', that is, clarity of perception, which is the precondition for *satori*. The English word for this, enlightenment, embodies much the same concept.

In Japanese Buddhist texts 'lack of brightness' is written *mumyō* (無明), two characters which have the same literal meaning as the Sanskrit original. *Mumyō* is related to *mushin* (無心), another significant term, about which, unfortunately, it is almost impossible to find an adequate explanation in contemporary go writing. The Buddhist conceptual background is now so remote in this century that even most go professionals have forgotten its origin.

Mushin literally means 'no mind'. Here the word 'mind' (Sanskrit *citta*, also translated as 'heart') signifies the place where the clinging tendency operates. 'No mind' thus means not a state of imbecility, which is a negative condition, but the mind in a state of no-clinging, a positive condition of perfect calmness and quietude in which things which impinge on the mind can take their real form and be correctly perceived. *Mushin*, therefore, is the rectification of *mumyō* and denotes the condition which produces clarity of perception, thereby making possible correct and effective action. This term *mushin* has long been used by go teachers and is still often seen written on fans or hung up in places where go is played seriously.

The senryū is a unique literary form which deals with the nature of *avidya* and its manifestations in human life. It was established in Japan in the middle of the eighteenth century, chiefly through the efforts of one man, Karai Hachiemon, whose pen-name was Senryū ('River Willow'

川柳), and it has been steadily cultivated by generations of pseudonymous and anonymous poets ever since.



In shape and length the senryū resembles the better-known haiku. Both are 17-syllable 3-line forms, but their content is entirely different. The haiku is about the seasons of the year and is (at least in its pristine form) entirely impersonal. The senryū, on the other hand, is intensely personal, sharp and often scathing in its implications. It is called 'comic' poetry, but the humor never arises from a gag or punch line as with most American and English jokes. It only begins to make its effect after the whole thing has been absorbed in the mind, whereupon it sets to work like yeast in a lump of dough. The reader need add nothing to a senryū, but he should make himself receptive to the logical implications of each word and idea. These implications extend outward from the 17-syllable core, ramifying in the dimensions of both time (before and after the moment) and space (along the periphery). In these new translations of old senryū about the game of go we have tried to keep to the original word order as far as possible, this being of some importance to the total effect.

*Tatta hito-ban to
uchihajimeta wa
sakujitsu nari*

Saying 'just one game'
they began to play ...
That was yesterday.

And they're still at it. This happens in chess as often as go, and we know of wives who have had to divorce their husbands for this reason. One of the main concerns of all senryu is the problem of time. The feeling here, to this translator at least, is like that of a great wheel set in motion and turning imperceptibly but inexorably, like day and night.

*Gokaisho to
isha to e tsukai
futari dashi*

To the go club and
to the doctor's, a pair
of servants is despatched.

A sudden emergency arises at home. They know where father is always to be found, so as a matter of course two servants are sent out, one to fetch him and one to fetch the doctor. Here the mechanism of the senryu seems to operate like that of a clockwork toy: a pin (the accident at home) trips a lever which actuates two figures which zip off in different directions, make a complicated pattern, then return to the centre. Since the Japanese have a passion for doctors and medicine the whole cycle would probably be repeated several times a year.

*Shinchō ni
utsu wa saisho no
ichi ni ban*

With caution and prudence
they play the first
one or two games.

A satire the force of which will be acknowledged by most amateurs. We all know in our hearts that we are really capable of playing better than we usually do. We like to start out calmly determined to show our true strength by avoiding our usual clumsy mistakes, but soon we forget, the old lack of brightness takes over, and we're playing as badly as we did yesterday. A visitor to a go club

will be tickled to see and recognize the parade of characteristic expressions which pass over the players' faces as they slowly descend through different stages of self-control.

*Go no jogen
iitakunaru to
niwa e tachi*

Go advice:
when he wants to speak out
he steps into the garden.

A bystander at a game should keep his mouth shut. The middle line of this senryu, a single complex verb, rather brilliantly conveys the feeling of swelling up, bursting with the desire to point out an obvious mistake, until one must either commit an impoliteness or go outside to relieve one's feelings.

*Go no rusu e
maotoko utte-
gae ni kuru*

He's out playing go.
Her lover, for a snap-
back, comes in.

Anyone who has seen the expression of chagrin, annoyance and sheepishness on the face of a go-player caught in a snapback should appreciate the force of this senryu. Here a technical go term is applied with wit and precision to the situation of the cuckold. Even the fact that in a snap-back it is one stone which slips in to capture a group somehow adds to the overall effect.

*Sumi ni ishi
korosarete kara
O-ki ga tsuku*

The stones in the corner —
after they have been killed
he starts to worry...

The comedy of a not very expert player pondering over the board and slowly becoming aware of a danger when it is already too late: two time-frames revolving slightly out of phase.

*Ishi wa iki-
ta ga shini-me ni wa
awanu nari*

His stones have
lived, but for the death-bed
he is not in time.

Two kinds of life and death are linked in one equation into which are factored two types of speed. Someone was scheduled to be present at the death-bed of a relative or friend but got involved with saving a group of stones in a game of go. These, after a struggle, lived, but meanwhile the other died.

*Sensei ni
yon moku, deshi ni mo
yon moku nari*

With the teacher,
it's four stones; with the pupil too,
it's four stones.

This neatly describes the chagrin of the earnest (and slightly vain) amateur go player who takes lessons. Usually he plays against his teacher, a professional, with a four stone handicap and perhaps is sometimes allowed to win. Then one day it's the teacher's professional pupil who gives him a lesson— a young sprig of thirteen or fourteen (as the word *deshi* implies), and he finds it just as difficult as playing against the venerable teacher. This senryu unflatteringly mocks the relationship between fees-paying amateurs and professional teachers while at the same time pointing up the huge gap between the two. What handicap the average amateur takes hardly matters; the professional will usually win if he wants to.

*Ki ni makete
kaereba uchi wa
arashi nari*

Losing at go,
when he returns, the house
becomes a tempest.

The word 'tempest' in the Japanese original is written with characters meaning 'fierce wind and rain'. When the testy player loses and returns to the bosom of his family the weather forecast is: depression followed by sharp words, gales and tears. The use of the formal word *ki* for go points up the contrast between the before and the after.

*O-aite no
go ni kachisō de
kangaeru*

With an exalted person
playing go, and in danger of
winning, he thinks hard.

A player who is stronger at go than his opponent, but socially his inferior, finds it necessary to think in reverse, so to speak. When this senryu was written, a lord could still take out his feelings on a commoner with a sword. Even today in Japan a company president, no matter how weak, somehow finds that the game ends in his favor when he plays with an underling.

*Go no shōbu
yobu koe de shiru
nyōbō kana*

Outcome of the game:
by the voice that calls her,
the wife knows.

At the end of a game with a guest at home, husband calls to wife for tea or cigarettes, and from long experience she can tell just by the tone of his voice whether he won or lost.

*Kaku utaba
nado to hebo go no
make-oshimi*

'If only I had played here'
etc., etc. — the go klutz's
pain at losing.



A 1931 cartoon by Kitazawa Rakuten

It is a wonderful thing to see how many amateur players are able to turn losses into victories during a post mortem discussion. Such people play on long after they should resign, and when the game reaches its dreary conclusion they point out to all who have the patience to listen that the opponent's winning moves were really a mistake, and that if Black had only played here and White there ... and so on and on.

*Shōben ni
okite nyōbō wa
go wo shikari*

Getting up
to piss, the housewife
scolds the go game.

She went to bed hours ago and they're still at it. She can't help letting off a few grumbles in their direction as she passes by. They, of course, don't hear a word. In fact if she ran by naked and screaming they probably would not notice a thing — if they were typical go players.

*Yōyaku ni
katte go kyaku ga
toki wo kiki*

At long last
winning, the go guest
asks the time.

Reluctance to stop while losing arises from the feeling, shared by most of us amateurs, that the only important games, the only games that really count, are the ones we win. No matter how many we lose, after a won game we can feel we have shown our true strength, we lean back with a modest smirk and begin to take note of the world again.

*Yo fukashi ni
tenjō made ga
go-ban nari*

In the depth of night
even the ceiling
becomes a go board.

A player is unable to stop thinking about his mistakes. Lying in bed, staring upward, he replays the game far into the night. A strange and interesting metaphor is here: the go stones move from



the board to the ceiling and beyond the ceiling to the sky where they become again the stars from which they were born thousands of years ago.

Here is one example of another kind of verse, a famous *kyōka* ('mad poem') attributed to Sansa, the first Honinbo and founder of that line. He is said to have composed it on his death-bed, which would date it in 1623. As a demonstration, perhaps, of *mushin*, and not without a touch of grim humor, he makes his own imminent death the subject.

*Go narabaya
kō ni mo tatete
iku beki wo
shinuru michi ni wa
te hitotsu mo nashi*

If this were go
I'd start a ko fight
and surely live,
but on the road to death
there's no move left at all.



Page from Go History

Campaigns for Rank and Status

When the 5th Honinbo Dochi died in 1727, the great period of prosperity initiated by Dosaku came to an end. A period of stagnation followed, in which the four go houses were headed by relatively minor players who contributed little to the development of the game. However, even this period was not without its share of drama.

The counterfeit application

Dochi was succeeded by his nephew, Chihaku (1710–1733), who was promoted to 6-dan when he became the 6th Honinbo in 1727. However, he outlived his predecessor by a mere four years, being struck down suddenly on the 20th August, 1733, probably by cerebral apoplexy, and dying the same day.

Chihaku's premature death caused a crisis in the go world, for he had not yet designated an heir. Without an officially recognised head, the continuation of the Honinbo line was imperilled and this was a threat to the well-being of the go world as a whole, so the heads of the other houses, who had been summoned immediately after Chihaku was struck down, rallied around to give assistance. After conferring, it was agreed that the only candidate for heir was Sato Shuhaku (1716–1741), so an application, purporting to have been written by Chihaku before his death, was composed and in it Shuhaku was named as heir.

This application was presented to the Commissioner for Shrines and Monasteries (*jisha-bugyo*), who had jurisdiction over go affairs, by the 4th Inoue head, Insetu Inseki. The commissioner was not happy, for he smelt a rat somewhere, but fortunately for the heads of the go houses, he could not quite put his finger on what was wrong. He did order a thorough investigation into the cause of Chihaku's death, but when he had satisfied himself that there was nothing amiss there, he finally granted Shuhaku official recognition as the Honinbo heir.

There was another problem as Shuhaku had returned to his parents' home near Aomori before Chihaku's death. Although a messenger was sent after him, summoning him back urgently, it was not until the 8th September that he actually got back to Edo. He was ordered to present himself before the commissioner on the 6th November to receive official confirmation of his new status and after an audience with the shogun later that month

played his first castle game as Honinbo. He was then 5-dan, but was promoted to 6-dan two years later.

When a crisis arose, such as the premature death of Chihaku, which affected the whole go world by threatening the stability of its organisational structure, the different go houses were quite ready to put aside their personal rivalries. In 1737 another problem came up which caused them to present a united front.

The shogi challenge

Shogi in the Edo period was organised along similar lines to go, though with only three hereditary houses to go's four. However, shogi players were ranked below go players in the official order of precedence established by the government and their stipends were correspondingly smaller. The actual order was as follows:

1. godokoro (if vacant, the Honinbo)
2. shogidokoro
3. heads of the other three houses (if the Honinbo was one of these, he was first, with the others coming in order of dan rank, or if the same dan in order of seniority)
4. shogi heads
5. heirs to the go houses
6. heirs to the shogi houses

In 1728, the year after Dochi's death, one of the greatest shogi players of the Edo period, Ito Sokan, had become the 7th Meijin shogidokoro at the age of 22. Ito Sokan was the Dosaku of the shogi world and he ushered in a period of great prosperity for shogi, ironically at a time when go was at a rather low ebb. Not surprisingly, this struck Ito Sokan as an excellent opportunity to redress the balance in prestige between go and shogi. He was further helped by the fact that he had allies among the *jisha-bugyo* (three or four commissioners were appointed at a time and rotated in office on a monthly basis), for two of the commissioners were pupils of his. One of them actually held the rank of 5-dan and Ito Sokan presented his petition in a month when he was in office.

The main point of Ito Sokan's petition was for precedence to be determined strictly by dan rank, or by seniority with players of the same dan. As Meijin, this would automatically elevate him above the 6-dan Honinbo Shuhaku.

Regardless of the actual merits of the case, the

go houses were determined to hang on to their traditional precedence. There was a long-established sense of superiority to shogi, arising partly from the fact that from the time of the first Honinbo Sansa go had enjoyed a closer relationship with ruling circles in Japan and also from the fact that Sansa had been appointed in 1612 as combined godokoro and shogidokoro, though he had soon relinquished the latter to Ohashi Sokei, the first shogi Meijin. The go heads therefore responded with a counter petition, arguing that since the dan ranks of the top players naturally varied from period to period, making the dan the criterion for precedence was inappropriate; rather the lineage of the house should be given most weight.

At this point a stroke of bad luck befell the shogi side, for their main ally, the 5-dan commissioner, fell ill and died. He was replaced by a very conservative commissioner who promptly gave a decision on the case, ordering that the precedence of go and shogi players should remain as hitherto. This was a lucky escape for the go heads, for they would have earned an unenviable place in go history if they had allowed themselves to be deprived of any of the traditional prerogatives of the go schools.

Hayashi Incho Monnyu's Meijin campaign

The leading player of the day was the 5th Hayashi head, Incho Monnyu (1690–1745), who in 1735 had been promoted to the rank of quasi-Meijin or 8-dan. Incho Monnyu was one of only two great players produced by the Hayashi school, the other being the 11th head, Hayashi Genbi (1778–1861). Incho Monnyu not only outranked the other heads – Honinbo Shuhaku 6-dan, the 5th Yasui, Shuntetsu Senkaku (1711–1789), and the 6th Inoue, Shunseki Inseki (1707–1772) – but was also two decades their senior. Not surprisingly, he began to aspire to the highest office of all.

At this time the Honinbo house was closely allied to the Yasui, while the Hayashis were allied to the Inoues. Incho Monnyu thus had little trouble persuading Inoue Shunseki Inseki to support an application by him for promotion to Meijin godokoro, but when Inoue was sent as an intermediary to talk over Shuhaku and Yasui, they completely refused to cooperate. Without their support, Incho Monnyu had no choice but to forget his ambition for the time being.

The following year there came a chance for revenge, however, as this time Shuhaku wanted

promotion to 7-dan. This rank, usually known as 'jozu' (skilful), was extremely important in the Edo period, as it was the top rank one could normally aspire to. Promotion to 8-dan (quasi-Meijin) or Meijin (9-dan) only occurred in exceptional cases. As Shuhaku's predecessor had died at 6-dan, he was anxious to ensure that the Honinbo school did not suffer the ignominy of stopping at 6-dan for two successive generations. In the absence of a Meijin godokoro, who had the authority to make promotions himself, applications to the jisha-bugyo had to be backed by a consensus of the four schools. Inoue Shunseki Inseki and Hayashi Incho Monnyu of course refused to support Shuhaku's application.

Shuhaku reacted to this rebuff by challenging Incho Monnyu to a match, to be played at the rate of twenty games a year. Incho Monnyu refused on the pretext of illness, but had Inoue Shunseki Inseki play in his place.

This match, the fourth of the six official challenge matches (sogo) played during the Edo period, began in October 1737, with Shuhaku playing on the handicap of black–black–white, but in May 1740, when Shuhaku was leading with 4 wins, 3 losses, 1 jigo, he collapsed with a stomach haemorrhage. Fearing that his concern about the match was hindering his recovery, Yasui Shuntetsu Senkaku persuaded the other two heads to agree to the 'suspension' of the match.

Shuhaku's health did not improve, however, and he died in February 1741, after appointing Ozaki Hakugen as his successor.




Figure 1 (1 – 70)

Game 5. Honinbo Shuhaku (B) v. Inoue Shunseki Inseki

Hayashi Incho Monnyu made yet another attempt to become Meijin godokoro, presenting an application supported by Inoue Shunseki Inseki to the jisha-bugyo in 1742. Yasui Shuntetsu Senkaku and the 8th Honinbo, Hakugen (1726–1754), wasted no time filing a formal objection. The commissioner agreed with their main argument, which was that the post of Meijin godokoro should be decided by fighting it out on the go board. This, for whatever reason, Incho Monnyu was not prepared to do, so he had to abandon for ever his dreams of attaining the highest honour of the go world.

Below we present two games from the Shuhaku – Inoue Shunseki Inseki challenge match.

Game Five

White: Inoue Shunseki Inseki 7-dan (5th Inoue)

Black: Honinbo Shuhaku 6-dan (7th Honinbo)

date: 27th January, 1740

Figure 1 (1 – 70)

White 10 shows that Shunseki Inseki is confident in his fighting ability. He gets the fight he wants when Black cuts at 27.

Figure 2 (71 – 127)

Black 71 should be at 86.

Black 77. Black has no answer to White 76. If Black 108, then White 107, Black 'a', White 106.

Black 127 ensures a win for Shuhaku.

Figure 3 (128 – 198)

Black 71. If at 74, White lives with White 73, Black 'a', White 'b'.

The record after 198 has not been preserved. Black wins by 4 points.




Figure 2 (71 – 127)




Figure 3 (128 – 198)

Game Eight

White: Inoue Shunseki Inseki

Black: Honinbo Shuhaku

date: 18th May, 1740

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 18, 20. Playing in the empty corner might seem more urgent, but Shunseki Inseki prefers to strengthen his group so that it will not come under attack.

Black 37. If at 42, White would probably attack with 'a'. This game looked as if it might be another fierce fighting game, but with White 38 it starts to turn into a territorial contest.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 70. If at 72 or 76, Black peeps at 'a' and




Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Figure 2 (51 - 100)




Figure 4 (150 - 200)
ko: 53, 56




Figure 3 (101 - 149)




Figure 5 (201 - 247)
ko (at 5): 19, 22, 25, 28, 33, 36;
42: connects (at 5); 47: connects (at 43)

easily lives.

Black 77. Black 'b' looks bigger.

Black 89. Black captures a stone, but he gets little joy out of it. White 80 proves to be a thorn in his side for the rest of the game.

Figure 3 (100 - 149)

White 28. If omitted, Black gets points in sente with Black 28, White 'a', Black 'b'.

Black 33 is the losing move. Black should cut at 'c', as he would be able to capture a stone in sente with White 'd', Black 34, White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g'. Black could then switch to 33.

Figure 4 (150 - 200)

White 64, setting up the cut at 72, is bigger

than capturing two stones with 67.

Figure 5 (201 - 247)

White wins by three points.

Shuhaku's illness meant that no clearcut result was obtained in this series, but this was not to be Shunseki Inseki's last clash with the Honinbo house. Although not one of the great players of the Edo period, he was one of only two to participate in two official challenge matches (the other was Yasui Sanchi - see GW 9, 10). The story of his second run-in with a Honinbo will be told in our next issue.

嘉為之觀海之程

松雪道人

